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NOTE

THE EUROPEAN UNION'S GATEKEEPER
INITIATIVE: THE EUROPEAN UNION ENLISTS
LAWYERS IN THE FIGHT AGAINST MONEY
LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST FINANCING
I.

INTRODUCTION

Globalization, the rapid expansion of the Internet, and
advancements in communications and transportation technologies all
seem to be either the symptoms or the causes of a more interconnected
and interdependent world. As these technological developments have
allowed companies and individuals to operate on a more global scale,
they have also allowed for the worldwide expansion of criminal activity
and heightened sophistication with which this activity is carried out and
financed. Drug trafficking, arms smuggling, terrorism, and human
trafficking are no longer of purely national concern, and the international
community has realized that criminals rely heavily on financial
transactions to disguise funds derived from, or used to commit, these
serious crimes.'
Accordingly, the hard stance many countries have taken in their
fight against the laundering of criminal proceeds as a way to combat that
international criminal activity is understandable. However, the manner in
which various countries have gone about doing so has raised great
debate and concern among members of the legal profession who are
fearful that they are being enlisted in this fight against money laundering
and terrorist financing. More specifically, these lawyers are fearful that
the fundamental principles of their profession, including attorney-client
confidentiality
and professional independence, will become its silent
2
victims.

1. Patricia Shaughnessy, The New EU Money-Laundering Directive: Lawyers as GateKeepers and Whistle-Blowers, 34 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 25,26 (2002).
2. News Release, Int'l Bar Ass'n, IBA Debates Concerns About Anti-Money Laundering
Legislation at FATF Summit (Nov. 16, 2006) (on file with the Hofstra Law Review).
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The European Union ("EU") has taken a particularly strong interest
in the fight against money laundering and has been one of the strongest
supporters of the international money laundering countermeasures since
their inception. The EU has taken an active role in the development of
money-laundering countermeasures and leads the way in adopting those
measures. 3 In its implementation of these countermeasures, the EU has
called on its people, businesses, and institutions to help join the fight
against money laundering. Ten years after the implementation of a
directive that imposed stringent identification and reporting duties on all
financial institutions and entities, and in the wake of the September 11 th
terrorist attacks, the EU called upon the legal profession to enlist in its
fight against money laundering and terrorist financing.4
Faced with the realization that lawyers are often vulnerable to being
used for money laundering activities, the European Council determined
that, in order to effectively prevent money laundering, it would be
necessary to cast a wider net. This new and wider net was to be cast to
cover not only the financial sector, but also certain professions that
regularly aided their clients in effectuating financial transactions, such as
accountants, notaries, and lawyers. This new directive imposed on
lawyers an obligation to report their clients to authorities if there was
mere suspicion that the client was engaging in money laundering
activities. Needless to say, the members of the legal profession across
Europe cried out in disbelief and concern that the dearly held principles
of client trust and confidentiality that had always been a cornerstone of
their profession were at risk of being undermined or even completely
eliminated.6
This Note will examine the manner in which the EU has chosen to
combat money laundering by analyzing the legislative framework of the
three directives that set forth the relevant money laundering
countermeasures and the major effects and obstacles those
3. Valsamis Mitsilegas & Bill Gilmore, The EU Legislative Framework Against Money
Laundering and Terrorist Finance: A Critical Analysis in the Light of Evolving Global Standards,
56 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 119, 119 (2007).

4. Id. at 122-24.
5. Shaughnessy, supra note 1, at 44.
6. COUNCIL OF BARS AND LAW SOC'YS OF EUR., CCBE COMMENTS ON THE COMMISSION
STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT: THE APPLICATION TO THE LEGAL PROFESSION OF DIRECTIVE
91/308/EEC ON THE PREVENTION OF THE USE OF THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM FOR THE PURPOSE OF
MONEY LAUNDERING
16, (Feb. 13, 2007), available at http://www.ccbe.org/fileadmin/
userupload/NTCdocument/EN_130207_CCBEcommelI194003555.pdf
[hereinafter
CCBE
COMMENTS TO THE COMMISSION]; Council of Bars and Law Soc'ys of Eur., CCBE-INFO, (CCBE,
Brussels,
Belgium),
Jan.
2007,
at
6-7,
available
at
http://www.ccbe.eu/
fileadmin/user.upload/NTCdocument/nI 7_enpdfl _I 179229661 .pdf [hereinafter CCBE-INFO].

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol37/iss1/8

2

Kirby: The European Union's Gatekeeper Initiative: The European Union En
THE EUROPEAN UNION'S GATEKEEPER INITIATIVE

2008]

countermeasures will have on the attorney-client relationship in Europe.
Part 1I of this Note will examine the way in which the attorney-client
relationship is regulated in Europe and in the various individual Member
States. Parts III and IV will outline the development and evolution of the
current anti-money laundering legislation in the EU with particular
emphasis on the effects it has had and will continue to have on the legal
profession. Part V will discuss the manner in which the EU Member
States have chosen to adopt the directives, as well as the various effects
that this national legislation implementing the directives has had on the
legal profession in the individual Member States. Finally, Part VI will
shift the focus to the United States and will discuss whether this
approach of enlisting lawyers in the fight against money laundering and
terrorist finance is merely a European inclination or a global
phenomenon that will eventually impact the legal profession in the
United States.
1I.
A.

REGULATION OF LEGAL ETHICS ISSUES IN EUROPE

Combined Regional and Global Regulation of Legal Ethics Issues

There are at least four documents, created at either a global or
regional level by either international or multiregional bar associations,
which have strongly influenced the regulation of the legal profession in
Europe. These documents include (1) the International Bar Association
("IBA") Resolution on Deregulating the Legal Profession; (2) the Union
Internationale des Avocats ("UIA") Turin Principles; (3) the Council of
Bars and Law Societies of Europe's ("CCBE") Code of Conduct; and (4)
the CCBE Charter of Core Principles of the European Legal Profession.7
The IBA and the UIA are the two main general-purpose
international bar associations. "The IBA tends to be more Englishlanguage, common-law oriented than the UIA, which is more French
language, civil-law oriented.",8 Both organizations include as members
"both bar association and individual lawyers from Africa, Asia,9
Australia, and South America, as well as Europe, and North America."
The IBA's Resolution on Deregulating the Legal Profession ("Core
Values Resolution") was drafted in response to the negotiations for the

7. Laurel S. Terry, A "How To" Guide for Incorporating Global and Comparative
Perspectives into the RequiredProfessionalResponsibility Course, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1135, 115054(2007).
8. Id.atli51.
9. Id. at 1151-52.
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General Agreement on Trade in Services ("GATS") and "identifies
the... 'core values' of the legal profession" that the Member States of
the World Trade Organization "should strive to protect during the GATS
negotiations."' 0
The UIA's Turin Principles were adopted in 2002 and refer to the
UN Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers" that were adopted in 1990
at the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and
the Treatment of Offenders in Havana, Cuba, as part of the UN's
ongoing efforts to implement standards across the globe to ensure the
administration of Criminal Justice.12 Both the UIA's Turin Principles
and the IBA's Core Values Resolution recognize a duty for lawyers to
keep "client matters" confidential. 3 However, the Turin Principles are
more specific in maintaining that under no circumstance
does a lawyer
4
have a duty to report the activities of his client.'
While the IBA and the UIA are considered influential, the CCBE is
the most influential multiregional bar association in Europe. It is an
international, non-profit association incorporated in Belgium and is
considered the official representative organization for the legal
profession in the EU and "acts as the liaison between the EU and
Europe's national bars and law societies."' 5 Its role as the voice of the
European legal profession is recognized by both the national bars and
law societies of the EU Member States, as well as by the EU
institutions. 16
The CCBE represents more than 700,000 lawyers and consists of
thirty-one delegations whose members are nominated by regulatory
bodies of the Bars and Law Societies in at least twenty-seven EU

10. Id. at 1152; IBA, Resolution on Deregulating the Legal Profession (adopted 1998),
http://www.ibanet.org/images/downloads/Resolution%20on%2Deregulating%20the%20Legal%20
Profession%201998.pdf (last visited Jan. 2, 2009) [hereinafter Core Values Resolution].
11. Int'l Assoc. of Lawyers, Charte de Turin sur l'Exercice de la Profession d'Avocat au
216me Si cle [Turin Principles of Professional Conduct for the Legal Profession in the 21st
Century]
(Oct.
27,
2002),
http://www.uianet.org/documents/qquia/resolutions/
Exercice%20de%201a%20Profession%20d'Avocat%20au%2021 eme%20siecle.pdf (last visited Jan.
2, 2009) [hereinafter Turin Principles].
12. Eighth U.N. Cong. on the Prevention of Crime & the Treatment of Offenders, Aug. 27Sept. 7, 1990, Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers 22, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.144/28 Rev. 1
(1990), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/h-comp44.htm [hereinafter UN Basic
Principles].
13. Turin Principles, supra note 11, at 4; Core Values Resolution, supra note 10.
14. Turin Principles, supranote 11, at 4.
15. CCBE.org, Introduction to the Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe,
http://www.ccbe.eu/index.php?id=l 2&L=0 (last visited Dec. 21, 2008).
16. Id.
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Member States and Switzerland. 17 Additionally, the CCBE includes two
associated members (Croatia and Turkey) and eight observer members
(Albania, Armenia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Georgia,
Moldova, Montenegro, Serbia, and Ukraine). 18 The CCBE has been at
the "forefront of advancing the views of European lawyers and
defending the legal principles upon which democracy and the rule of law
are based."' 19
The CCBE Code of Conduct for European Lawyers was first
adopted in 1988 and most recently revised in 2006.20 It was "designed to
apply to EU lawyers who are engaged in cross-border transactions with
one another" and could be considered the counterpart of the ABA Model
Rules. 21 The CCBE Charter of Core Principles of the European Legal
Profession, on the other hand, was adopted in a plenary meeting in
November 2006.22 This document may wind up having a broader reach
than the CCBE Code of Conduct, "because the Council of Europe has
expressed interest in this document" as a guideline for the development
of a common code of ethics for lawyers.23 However, until the creation of
such a common code of ethics, the CCBE Code of Conduct continues to
be the most important document affecting the legal profession in Europe.
The CCBE objects to the inclusion of lawyers within the scope of
the money laundering directives because such inclusion would result in a
"breach of the independence of a lawyer and the irrevocable violation of
the principle of client confidentiality. 24 Additionally, access to legal
advice is jeopardized if a lawyer is obligated to report his suspicions
concerning the client to the relevant authorities. 25 The right of a client to
consult a lawyer and be assisted by a lawyer in confidence is a
fundamental right, which in some countries is even constitutionally
protected.26 The CCBE has always given professional secrecy great
importance and has even incorporated this ethic in its Code of Conduct,
17. Terry, supra note 7, at 1149; see also CCBE, Members
http://www.ccbe.eu/index.php?id=22&L=0 (last visited Dec. 26, 2008).
18. CCBE, supra note 17.
19. CCBE.org, supra note 15.
20.

by

Countries,

COUNCIL OF BARS AND LAW SOC'YS OF EUR., CODE OF CONDUCT FOR EUROPEAN

LAWYERS (2006), available at http://www.ccbe.org/fileadmin/userupload/NTCdocument/
2006_code enpdfl_1228293527.pdf [hereinafter CCBE CODE OF CONDUCT].
21. Terry, supra note 7, at 1149.
22. CCBE-INFO, supra note 6, at 3.
23. Terry, supra note 7, at 1154.
24. CCBE COMMENTS TO THE COMMISSION, supra note 6, 10.
25. Id.
26. In Germany, for example, the right of a client to be assisted by a lawyer in confidence is
constitutionally protected. See infra note 40 and accompanying text.
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which states that "[c]onfidentiality
is ... a primary and fundamental
27
right and duty of the lawyer."
In February 2001, the CCBE issued a "Statement of Position on
Lawyers' Confidentiality" in which it expressed the concern that the
obligation to report on clients could lead to the erosion of the attorneyclient relationship and the underlying concept of professional secrecy
and confidentiality. 28 It also emphasized that the prevention of criminal
activities such as money laundering should not be pursued in a manner
that is inconsistent with the protection of lawyers' obligations of
29
confidentiality.
B. NationalRegulation ofAttorney-Client Confidentiality
Within the countries of the EU, what is known as the "legal
privilege" encompasses the core principle of lawyer-client
confidentiality (also known throughout Europe as the principle of
professional secrecy).30 In civil law systems, confidentiality is a single
concept that is absolute, which means that confidential information
protected by the rule cannot be revealed by the lawyer even if the client
consents. 31 In common law systems, the principle of confidentiality
incorporates two related bodies of law, "the attorney-client privilege
(which includes the work product doctrine) in the law of evidence and
the rule of confidentiality set forth in a code of ethics for the
profession." 32 In such common law systems, the confidential information
belongs to the client, which means that the information can be revealed
if the client consents.33
The manner in which Member States choose to regulate the legal
privilege varies from country to country. In common law countries, such
as the United Kingdom, the privilege has been developed by an
27.
28.

CCBE CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 20, § 2.3.1.
COUNCIL OF BARS AND LAW SOC'YS OF EUR., STATEMENT OF POSITION ON LAWYERS'

CONFIDENTIALITY
14
(Feb.
22,
2001),
available at
http://www.ccbe.org/
fileadmin/userupload/NTCdocument/secretprofukpdfl_l 184072657.pdf.
29. Id. 13.
30. See, e.g., Case 309/99, Wouters v. Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van
Advocaten, 2002 E.C.R. 1-1577 182 (Opinion of Advocate General Leger).
31. ABA Sec. of Int'l Law, Ad Hoc Task Force on Money Laundering & Prof'l
Responsibilities, Comments to the ABA Task Force on Attorney-Client Privilege Pertaining to the
Gatekeeper Initiative, the Attorney-Client Privilege and Client Confidentiality, and International
Perspectives
on
Legal
Professional
Privilege
10
(May
5,
2005),
http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/attorneyclient/publichearing200O5421/testimony/laundering3.pdf
[hereinafter ABA Comments on the Gatekeeper Initiative].
32. Id.
33. Id.; see also CCBE Comments to the Commission, supra note 6, 11.
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extensive body of case law. In civil law countries, the privilege is
normally regulated by national law or regulation either by enactment of
specific legislation to govern the conduct of lawyers, or by the inclusion
of sanctions for a breach of the privilege into that state's penal code, or
by a combination of both.34 In some instances, the privilege is even
directly guaranteed in a member state's national constitution. 35 In
addition, many Member States have also developed their own legislation
to specifically address the related principle of confidentiality
(professional secrecy).36
In the United Kingdom, where the privilege has been developed by
case law, the legal privilege is referred to as the legal professional
privilege. 37 In 1996, the House of Lords confirmed the absolute nature of
the legal professional privilege in its ruling in R. v. Derby Magistrates'
Court, ex parte B and another Appeal.38 The Lords further held that the
privilege is a "fundamental condition on which the administration of
justice as a whole rests[,]" reasoning that people would not seek
assistance from counsel if that counsel could be compelled to testify
against them and, consequently, that they would not be able to defend
39
themselves properly.
In Germany, the approach is twofold. First, the right to a fair trial,
which is inextricably linked to the concept of lawyer-client
confidentiality, is embodied in Article 20(3) and Article 2(1) of the
national Constitution (Grundgesetz) setting forth, respectively, the
constitutional principles for the Rule of Law (Rechtstaatprinzip) and the
basic provision on liberty.40 Second, the legal profession is also
regulated by a Federal Code for Lawyers (Bundesrechtsanwaltordnung
or "BRAO"). 41 Before 1994, "the BRAO only imposed on the lawyer a
general duty to work in a reliable, thorough, conscientious, and careful
manner such that he proves himself worthy of the respect and trust of
34. The Application to the Legal Profession of Directive 91/308/EEC on the Prevention of the
Use of the Financial System for the Purpose of Money Laundering, PARL. EUR. Doc. (SEC 1793)
(Dec. 21, 2006), available at http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/06/stl7/st l7064.enO6.pdf
[hereinafter Commission Staff Working Document].

35.
36.
37.
38.
(U.K.)).
39.

Id.
Id.
Caryl Ben Basat & Julian D. Nihill, CorporateCounsel, 31 INT'L LAw. 245, 250 (1997).
Id.(citing Regina v. Derby Magistrates' Court, ex p B, [1996] 1 A.C. 487, 508-09 (H.L.)
Id.

40.

GRUNDGESETZ FOR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GG] [Constitution], May 23,
1949, Bundesgesetzblatt [BGB1] I at 1, arts. 20(3), 2(1), available at http://www.gesetze-imintemet.de/bundesrecht/gg/gesamt.pdf.
41. Basat & Nihill, supra note 37, at 253.
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others. 42 The BRAO was amended in 1994 to include Section 43(a),
which unambiguously "laid down the duty of the lawyer to keep
information obtained from clients confidential," including "all
information that the lawyer receives in the course of exercising his
profession. 43 A breach of BRAO Section 43(a) is punishable with a fine
or suspension by the attorney self-regulating body. 4
Both France and Spain are examples of countries that have
criminalized the breach of the legal privilege and thereby also the breach
of professional secrecy. In France, the legal privilege was embodied in
Article 378 of the former French Penal Code.45 Article 378 made it a
criminal offense for a lawyer to divulge any confidential information,
which a client had given him in the course of professional dealings.4 6
The provisions regarding the legal privilege were not substantially
modified when the new Penal Code was enacted in 1994. 47 In Spain, the
legal privilege "is regulated, both as a right and as a duty, by the General
By-laws for the Legal Profession of 1982 (Estatuto General de la
Abogacia) and by the By-Laws for Court Solicitors (Estatuto General de
los Procuradores de los Tribunales). 4 8 An amendment was made to the
Criminal Code in 1996, under which professionals who disclose their
clients' confidential information are subject to four years imprisonment
and confiscation of their license to practice for two to six years. 49
III.

ORIGIN OF THE

EU MONEY LAUNDERING DIRECTIVE

The European Community and its Member States have actively
participated in the development of international and regional moneylaundering countermeasures from their inception. These early
countermeasures included the 1988 UN Convention Against Illicit
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances ("Vienna
Convention") and the Council of Europe 1990 Convention on
Laundering, Search, Seizure, and Confiscation of the Proceeds from
Crime ("Money Laundering Convention"). 50 Additionally, many EU
Member States (including all original fifteen European Community
42.

Id.

43.

Id.

44.
45.
46.

Id.
Id. at 252.
Id.

47.

Id.

48.
49.

Id. at 258.
Id.

50. WILLIAM C. GILMORE, DIRTY MONEY: THE EVOLUTION OF MONEY LAUNDERING
COUNTERMEASURES 50, 124 (2d ed. 1999).
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Member States) and the European Commission have participated in the
Financial Action Task Force and have contributed significantly to the
development of the Financial Aid Task Force's ("FATF") 40
Recommendations. 5
These international agreements are essential to understanding the
EU's response to money laundering and the development of the EU
money-laundering directives.5 2 Thus, the first EU money-laundering
Directive adopted in 1991 could be considered a combined product of
the approaches of the Vienna Convention and the Money Laundering
Convention on one hand, and the recommendations of the FATF on the
other.53
A.

Vienna Convention

In recognition of escalating international drug production and
trafficking, the United Nations drafted the Vienna Convention. 4 This
Convention has been considered the "primary international effort to halt
the laundering of drug proceeds upon which the [EU Directives] and
other efforts rely., 55 It was formally enacted in November 1990 after
being ratified by the requisite twenty nations 56 with the aim of depriving
"persons engaged in illicit traffic of the proceeds of their criminal
activities and thereby eliminate their main incentive for so doing." 57 The
Convention focuses upon international cooperation as the essential
means for eliminating "drug money laundering," 58 and calls on all
member countries to adopt national measures criminalizing 59the
laundering of proceeds derived from drug trafficking and production.

51.
52.
53.

Mitsilegas & Gilmore, supra note 3, at 119.
See id.
Id.

54. Scott E. Mortman, Note, Putting Starch in European Efforts to Combat Money
Laundering,FORDHAM L. REV., May 1992, at S429, S440.

55. Id at S439.
56. Id.at S440.
57. Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances pmbl.,
opened for signature Dec. 20, 1988, 1582 U.N.T.S. 95, reprinted in 28 I.L.M 493, available at

http://www.unodc.org/pdf/convention_1988_en.pdf (last visited Jan. 2, 2009) [hereinafter Vienna
Convention]. Signatories to the Vienna Convention include Cyprus, Denmark, Great Britain, Italy,
Luxembourg, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, and the United States. Mortman, supra note 54, at
S440 n.84.
58. Mortman, supra note 54, at S440.
59. Vienna Convention, supra note 57, at art. 3.
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Council of Europe Money-Laundering Convention

The Council of Europe is not an institution of the EU and should
not be confused with the Council of the EU (also known as the EU
Council). It was originally created by and limited to ten western
European countries with the aim of achieving "a greater unity between
its members for the purpose of safeguarding and realising the ideals and
principles which are their common heritage and facilitating their
economic and social progress., 60 After the fall of Communism at the end
of the Cold War, the Council was able to include more central and
eastern European countries such as Russia and the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia. The inclusion of these countries enabled the
Council to become the "first truly pan-European organisation. ' '6 1
The Council of Europe was the first organization to concentrate
methodically on money laundering. 62 In 1980, it adopted a
recommendation entitled "Measures Against the Transfer and
Safekeeping of Funds of Criminal Origin." 63 This recommendation was
the first to impose the "know-your-customer" rule, which today is a
supporting pillar of any money-laundering countermeasure.6 4 The main
idea behind the know-your-customer rule was that by promoting more
scrutiny within banking services through more direct customer
identification, and relaxing national bank secrecy laws, banking
institutions could serve as guarding portals against the deposit of illgotten gains.65 The criminals could thereby not only be identified, but
also discouraged from using the banking system to launder their criminal
proceeds.66
In 1990, the Council incorporated this recommendation in the
Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the
Proceeds from Crime.67 The Convention ultimately shifted the approach

60. Statute of the Council of Europe, Europ. T.S. No. 1, art. I(a), (Aug. 3, 1949), available at
http://cms.ifa.de/fileadmin/content/informationsforum/kulturabkommen/ec-ets00 I_en.pdf.
61. GILMORE, supra note 50, at 121. Today, the Council of Europe has forty-seven members
and five observer members including the Holy See, the United States, Canada, Japan, and Mexico.
COE.int, About the Council of Europe, http://www.coe.int/T/e/Com/about-coe/ (last visited Jan. 2,
2009).
62. GILMORE, supra note 50, at 123.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.at 123; Konstantinos D. Magliveras, The European Community's Combat Against
Money Laundering:Analysis and Evaluation, 5 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 93, 102 (1998).
66. See GILMORE, supra note 50, at 123.
67. Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime,
Europ. T.S. No. 141, pmbl. (Aug. 11, 1990), available at http://conventions.coe.int/
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from a prevention-based mechanism to an approach that allowed for the
implementation of criminal sanctions. The main purpose of the
Convention was "to facilitate international co-operation as regards
investigative assistance, search, seizure and confiscation of the proceeds
from all types of criminality, especially serious crimes, and in particular
drug offences, arms dealing, terrorist offences, trafficking in children
and young women... and other offenses which generate large profits. 69
The Convention, therefore, effectively broadened the scope of the prior
1988 Vienna Convention, which only covered the laundering of
proceeds derived from drug offenses.7 °
Indeed, by 1999 twenty-five states had acceded to the Convention,
which made it the most important and successful international agreement
71
in the field of money laundering since the Vienna Convention.
Additionally, the Convention does not use the word "European," which
indicates the legislators' intent to expand the membership and
applicability of the agreement beyond Europe's borders.7 2
C. FinancialAction Task Force
The EU also relied heavily on the FATF's report in formulating its
money-laundering directives.7 3 The FATF is an intergovernmental body,
74
which was established by the G-7 Economic Summit Group in 1989,

with the aim of developing and promoting policies to combat money
laundering 75 and which has "spearheaded" the international anti-money
laundering efforts for more than a decade.76 Currently, the FATF
membership includes thirty-two countries and two regional
organizations (the European Commission and the Gulf Cooperation
Council).77
Treaty/Commun/QueVoulezVous.asp?NT=141&CL=ENG
Proceeds from Crime Convention].
68. Mortman, supra note 54, at S436.
69. GILMORE, supra note 50, at 125.
70. See id.
71. Id.at 124.

[hereinafter

Confiscation

of

the

72. Id.
73. Mortman, supranote 54, at S436.
74. FATF-GAFI.org, History of the Financial Action Task Force, http://www.fatfgafi.org/document/63/0,3343,en_32250379_32236836_34432255_ 1 1 1 1,00.html (last visited
Jan. 1, 2009).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. FATF-GAFI.org, Members and Observers of the Financial Action Task Force,
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/document/52/0,3343,en_32250379_32237295

340271881 1 1

1,00.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2009). The FATF members include Argentina, Australia, Austria,
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The driving force behind the FATF's effort to combat money
laundering is its official report consisting of 40 Recommendations that
were issued in 1990 and subsequently revised in 1996 and again in
2003.78 Even though the original 40 Recommendations were designed to
"combat misuse of financial systems" by persons attempting to launder
drug money, the subsequent revisions also address the laundering of
money derived from other serious crimes.7 9
Furthermore, the FATF has adopted nine additional Special
Recommendations, which, in combination with the revised 40
Recommendations, create a comprehensive "framework to detect,
80
prevent and suppress the financing of terrorism and terrorist acts.
Since the 40+9 Recommendations do not have the force of law, the
FATF can only encourage member countries to implement them through
national

law, regulation,

or policy. 8'

However,

the FATF Forty

Recommendations have currently been endorsed by more than 130
as the "leading international anticountries and are widely accepted
82
money laundering standard.,
In 2001, the FATF initiated a review of its 40 Recommendations in
order to "identify numerous ways that the Recommendations could be
expanded to address increasingly sophisticated money laundering
techniques and to combat terrorist financing." 83 The review resulted in a
"Consultation Paper" issued on May 30, 2002, outlining various ways of
strengthening national money-laundering countermeasures. 84 The
Consultation Paper proposed that the existing and new anti-money
laundering initiatives be extended to non-financial businesses and
professionals such as casinos, real estate brokers, lawyers, notaries,
accountants, and auditors, as well as investment advisors. 85 This
Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, the European Commission, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
The Gulf Cooperation Council, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, New Zealand,
Norway, Portugal, Russian Federation, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Id.
78.

ABA Comments on the Gatekeeper Initiative, supra note 31, at 2; see also FATF-

GAFI.org, supra note 74.
79. ABA Comments on the Gatekeeper Initiative, supra note 31, at 2.
80.

FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE ON MONEY LAUNDERING, SPECIAL RECOMMENDATIONS ON

TERRORIST FINANCING (2001), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/8/17/34849466.pdf (last visited
Jan. 12, 2009) [hereinafter FATF SPECIAL RECOMMENDATIONS].

81.

ABA Comments on the Gatekeeper Initiative, supra note 31, at 2.

82.

FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE ON MONEY LAUNDERING, REVIEW OF THE FATF FORTY

RECOMMENDATIONS: CONSULTATION PAPER § 2.1.2 (May 30, 2002), available at http://www.fatfgafi.org/dataoecd/32/3/34046414.pdf [hereinafter FATF CONSULTATION PAPER].
83. ABA Comments on the Gatekeeper Initiative, supra note 31, at 2.
84. Id.
85. FATF CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 82, § 5 art. 231.
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proposal has been colloquially dubbed the "Gatekeeper Initiative," and
stands for the idea that certain professionals, such as lawyers, under
certain circumstances act as "'gatekeepers' to the international financial
and business markets and should be enlisted to support law8enforcement
6
efforts to combat money laundering and terrorist financing."
The specific anti-money-laundering initiatives, which the
Consultation Paper considered extending to lawyers included mainly:
(1) increased regulation and supervision of the profession, (2)
increased due diligence requirements on clients, (3) new internal
compliance training and recordkeeping requirements for lawyers and
law firms, and, (4) under certain circumstances, 'suspicious transaction
reporting' .. requirements that would require lawyers to report to a
government
enforcement
agency
or
a
self-regulatory
organization... information that trigers a 'suspicion' of money
laundering relating to a client activity.
Furthermore, the Consultation Paper promulgated the so-called "no
tipping off' rule, which sets forth that lawyers should be prohibited from
informing their clients when a Suspicious Transaction Report ("STR")
has been filed.88
On June 20, 2003, the FATF issued a revised version of its 40
Recommendations, which incorporated the Consultation Paper's
proposal that lawyers, notaries, other independent legal professionals
and accountants be subject to the STR requirement, to the extent that,
"on behalf of or for a client, they engage in a financial transaction in
relation to": 89 (1) "buying and selling of real estate;" (2) "managing of

client money, securities or other assets;" (3) "management of bank,
savings or securities accounts;" (4) "organisation of contributions for the
creation, operation or management of companies;" and (5) "creation,
operation or management of legal persons or arrangements, and buying
and selling of business entities." 90 The Revised Recommendations also
incorporated the "no-tipping off' rule, 91 but the interpretive notes set
forth a limitation to the rule in that a lawyer's efforts to dissuade a client

86.

ABA Comments on the Gatekeeper Initiative, supra note 31, at 2.

87. Id.
88. Id.
89. FIN. AcI ION TASK FORCE, THE FORTY RECOMMENDATIONS, rec. 16(a) (June 20, 2003),
available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/7/40/34849567.pdf [hereinafter FATF 2003 FORTY
RECOMMENDATIONS].
90. Id. at rec. 12(d).
91. Id. at rec. 14(b).
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from 2 engaging in questionable conduct should not constitute "tipping
9

off."

The Revised Recommendations do acknowledge the existence of
the
attorney-client
privilege.
Specifically,
the
Revised
Recommendations state that the STR requirement would not apply if the
"relevant information was obtained in circumstances where they are
93
subject to professional secrecy or legal professional privilege.,
"However, the scope of the exception is unclear." 94 An interpretive note
states that "[i]t is for each jurisdiction to determine the matters that
95
would fall under legal professional privilege or professional secrecy.,
Typically, this would cover "information lawyers... receive from or
obtain through one of their clients: (a) in the course of ascertaining the
legal position of their client, or (b) in performing their task of defending
or representing that client in, or concerning judicial, administrative,
arbitration or mediation proceedings. 9 6
Currently, the FATF 40+9 Recommendations are considered the
most influential standards regarding the deterrence and prevention of
money laundering and have been widely implemented by various FATF
member countries in accordance with their particular circumstances and
constitutional frameworks; however, in many countries, especially
within the EU, implementation is proving challenging with regard to the
legal profession.9 7 Lawyers in these countries have expressed concern
that the obligation to report suspicious transactions breaches the
principle of lawyer-client confidentiality, and therefore "severely harms
the rule of law and democracy; and impairs access to justice. 98 They
also maintain that enforcement of the STR requirement is incompatible
with the responsibility all lawyers have to their clients and to society at
large. According to the IBA, this incompatibility of the STR requirement
with the notion of lawyer-client confidentiality is the main reason the
United States has not yet implemented this aspect of the FATF. 99

92. Id. at annex, rec. 14.
93. Id. atrec. 16.

94. ABA Comments on the Gatekeeper Initiative, supra note 31, at 3.
95. FATF 2003 FORTY RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 89, at annex, rec. 16.

96. Id.
97. News Release, Int'l Bar Ass'n, supra note 2.

98. Id.
99. Id.
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IV.

LEGISLATIVE EVOLUTION OF THE MONEY-LAUNDERING
DIRECTIVE IN EUROPE

EU law now has what is known as a three pillar structure.100 This
structure is "often presented as resembling a temple fagade with three
pillars supporting the architrave and pediment of the [European]
Union." 10 1 The First Pillar encompasses what are often referred to as the
European Communities, which include the European Coal and Steel
Community ("ECSC") in existence since 1952, the European Atomic
Energy Community ("Euratom") set up in 1958, and the European
Economic Community ("EEC") established under the Treaty of Rome in
1957.102 The Second Pillar of EU law aspires to create a common foreign
and security policy ("CFSP"), while the Third Pillar mandates
cooperation in justice and home affairs. 0 3 This three pillar structure of
the EU creates a distinction between Community law and EU law.
Community law is limited to the First Pillar, which is governed by the
provisions and articles of the Treaty of Rome and focuses on the social
and economic foundations of the single market. This First Pillar,
collectively with the other two pillars, establish the entire body of EU
law. 104

When the EEC was established by the Treaty of Rome in 1957, it
only addressed economic integration. In 1993, it was amended by the
Maastricht Treaty and officially renamed the Treaty Establishing the
European Community or EC Treaty. 10 5 The Maastricht Treaty was
"superimposed" over the Treaty of Rome, which had the effect of not
only amending the Treaty of Rome but also of establishing two
additional pillars to the already existing pillar of Community law on

100.

P.S.R.F. MATHIJSEN, A GUIDE TO EUROPEAN UNION LAW 4 (7th ed. 1999).

101. P.J.G. KAPTEYN & P. VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION 38 (3d ed. 1998).
102. MATHIJSEN, supra note 100, at 4. "When reference is made to the 'Community', it is the
EEC which is generally meant, the other two communities no longer play an independent role; for
all practical purposes they have been absorbed into the EEC." Id.
103. KAPTEYN & VAN THEMAAT, supra note 101, at 38. The Second and Third Pillar are kept
"strictly separated" from the First Pillar and "operate in a much more intergovernmental
framework,... in which.., the Commission, while it is fully associated with the work, does not
have the sole right of initiative which is so central to its pivotal status in the Communities" (that is,
the First Pillar). Id.
104. WALTER CAIRNS, INTRODUCTION TO EUROPEAN UNION LAW 2 (1997); see also RALPH H.
FOLSOM, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN UNION LAW 7 (2005).

105.

FOLSOM, supra note 104, at 6-7.
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economic integration.I0 6 The ratification of the Maastricht Treaty created
07
the basic three pillar structure for what is today known as the EU.
The Maastricht Treaty ultimately expanded the areas deemed of
"common interest" to include judicial and customs cooperation, with the
aim of "preventing and combating crime, organised or otherwise, in
particular terrorism, trafficking in persons and offences against children,
illicit drug trafficking and illicit arms trafficking, corruption and
fraud."' 0 8 Until the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty, areas such as
justice and home affairs were considered inalienable national concerns,
outside the purview and reach of the Community.
In 1999, the Treaty of Amsterdam transferred the areas of illegal
immigration, visas, asylum, and judicial co-operation to the European
Community (the First Pillar) and the Third Pillar was amended to control
"Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters ("PJCC")."' 0 9 The
designation "Justice and Home Affairs" now refers both to the fields that
have been transferred to the First Pillar governed by the EC Treaty as
well as the fields0 that have remained under the Third Pillar of Justice and
Home Affairs."
Article 249 of the EC Treaty sets forth the types of legal acts that
the political institutions of the Community may take and the legal effects
those acts shall have."' More precisely, Article 249 provides that the
European Council, the European Parliament (acting jointly with the
Council), and the European Commission may, "in accordance with the
provisions of this Treaty," issue
regulations, directives, decisions,
2
1
opinions."
or
recommendations,
Regulations and directives are the two primary types of legislative
acts within the EU. While a regulation has general application and is
binding "in its entirety and directly applicable" in all Member States,
directives are only binding upon each Member State in regard to the
"result to be achieved" and leaves to the national authorities the "choice

106. ld.at 7, 19.
107. KAPTEYN & VAN THEMAAT, supra note 101, at 38.

108. Treaty on European Union (consolidated text), Dec. 29, 2006, 2006 0.3. (C 321), art. 29,
available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri-OJ:C:2006:321 E:0001:
0331 :EN:pdf [hereinafter Maastricht Treaty]; see also GILMORE, supra note 50, at 155.
109. Verena Murschetz, The Future of Criminal Law Within the European Union-Union Law
or Community Law Competence?, 38 VICT. U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 145, 146 (2007).
110. Id.
11. FOLSOM, supra note 104, at 30.
112. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Dec. 29, 2006, 2006 0.1 (C 321), art. 249

[hereinafter EC Treaty].
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of form and methods." ' 1 3 A directive establishes Union policy and leaves
it to the Member States to achieve the implementation of that policy in
"whatever way is appropriate to their national legal system." ' 1 4 This may
involve a "new statute, a Presidential
decree, an administrative act or
' 15
even a constitutional amendment." "
A.

"FirstDirective"-CouncilDirective 91/308/EEC

Council Directive 91/308/EEC on prevention of the use of the
financial system for the purpose of money laundering ("First Directive")
was issued in 1991, two years before the creation of a framework for the
cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs under the Third Pillar of EU
law, created by the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993.116 These
circumstances posed two distinct constitutional obstacles to the
enactment of the money laundering legislation.
First, "[a]ny legislation dealing with money laundering
countermeasures would.., have to be adopted with a legal basis under
the EC Treaty" (the First Pillar)." 7 This caused some difficulty since
money-laundering legislation is arguably of a criminal law nature and
has as its primary objective the fighting of crime, which was still
considered a purely national concern. 1 8 Second, the legislation would
defy the limits posed by EC law in accommodating criminal law, as well
as the limits of EC competence, to adopt legislation that defined criminal
offenses and imposed sanctions." 19
It was finally agreed that the legal basis for the legislation would be
founded on the economic nature of the Directive in that the prevention of
money laundering "was essential to ensure the integrity of the
Community financial system and the internal market."' 120 Thus, it was
possible to adopt the First Directive under the First Pillar based on a
113. Id. Decisions are only binding upon those to whom they are addressed. Recommendations
and Opinions have no binding force. Id.
114. FOLSOM, supra note 104, at 31.
115. Id.

116. Mitsilegas & Gilmore, supra note 3, at 136.
117. Id. at 135.
118. Id.
119. Id. Article 230 of the EC Treaty provides that lack of competence is grounds for
invalidating Community measures. EC Treaty, supra note 112, at arts. 230-31. The principle of
competence requires that both the Community as an entity has authority to take certain action and
that the particular institution taking the action is the competent authority to do so. Case C-327/91,
France v. Comm'n, 1994 E.C.R. 1-3641 26, 42 (concluding that the antitrust agreement signed
between the Commission and the United States was void because only the Council, rather than the
Commission, had competence to conclude such an agreement).
120. Mitsilegas & Gilmore, supra note 3, at 136.
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"dual free-movement/internal market legal basis" even though the
primary nature of the Directive was ostensibly of a criminal law
nature. 12 1 Regarding the issue of competence, or rather the Community's
lack thereof, a compromise was reached and instead of criminalizing
money laundering under the Directive (for which the Community had no
competence), it was merely prohibited. 122 However, even though the
First Directive did not expressly impose an obligation on Member States
to criminalize money laundering, the practical effect of the Directive's
prohibition left them with little choice
and money laundering was soon
23
criminalized in all Member States.
Article 1 of the First Directive sets forth a definition of money
laundering derived from the Vienna Convention' 24 and provides that:
Money Laundering means the following when committed
intentionally:
- the conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property is
derived from criminal activity or from an act of participation in such
activity, for the purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin
of the property or of assisting any person who is involved in the
commission of such activity to evade the legal consequences of his
action;
- the concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location,
disposition, movement, rights with respect to, or ownership of
property, knowing that such property is derived from criminal
activity or from participation in such activity;
- the acquisition, possession or use of property, knowing, at the time of
receipt, that such property was derived from criminal activity or from
an act of participation in such activity;
- participation in, association to commit, attempts to commit and
aiding, abetting, facilitating and counseling the commission
of any of
25
the actions mentioned in the foregoing indents. 1
Article 1 also states that the offense of money laundering is
committed even where "the activities which generated the property to be
laundered were carried out in the territory of another Member State or in

121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Mortman, supra note 54, at S432.
125. Council Directive 91/308, On Prevention of the Use of the Financial System for the
Purpose of Money Laundering, art. I(C), 1991 O.J. (L 166) (EC) [hereinafter First Directive]
(emphasis added).
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that of a third country."' 126 Article 1 sets forth the applicable definition of
Credit and Financial Institutions, which attempts to cover the whole
financial system of the European Community by making its provisions
not only applicable to banks but also to all types of credit and financial
12 7
institutions that are being used or could be used by money launderers.
The Article 1 definition of Criminal Activity of the First Directive
encompassed all offenses specified in Article 3(1)(a) of the Vienna
Convention, 28 which includes "the cultivation, production, manufacture,
transportation and sale of narcotic drugs and the management or
financing of any of these activities."' 29 The First Directive further states
that "Member States may designate any other offence as a criminal
activity for the purposes of this Directive."'' 30 This wording has created
two related problems. First, many Member States may not feel
compelled to "extend the scope of [the] prohibited money laundering
operations to proceeds other than those deriving from drug trafficking
offenses (the predicate offenses)."' 131 Second, when Member States have
decided to go beyond the predicate offenses listed in the Directive, the
expansion has not been uniform, leading to considerable disparities
among national legislation. 32
By combining the approaches of the UN, the Council of Europe,
and the FATF, the First Directive created a two-pronged approach of
criminalization and prevention of money laundering. This dual approach
to money laundering made the "First Directive the first major regional
instrument" to adopt a nearly "comprehensive anti-money laundering
framework."' 33 Regarding the criminalization approach, Article 2 of the
First Directive provided that "Member States shall ensure that money
laundering as defined in this Directive is prohibited.' ' 34 Originally, this
article stated that Member States shall "ensure that money laundering is
treated as a criminal offense" but this wording was strongly opposed by
the Council of Ministers due to the Community's lack of competence to
legislate in the area of criminal law. 135 Since this opposition ultimately

126. Id.
127. Id. at art. 1; see also Magliveras, supranote 65, at 97.
128. First Directive, supra note 125, at art. I(E).
129. Magliveras, supra note 65, at 99; see also Vienna Convention, supra note 57, art.
3(l)(a)(i).
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

First Directive, supra note 125, at art. I(E).
Magliveras, supra note 65, at 99.
Id.
Mitsilegas & Gilmore, supra note 3, at 119-20.
First Directive, supra note 125, at art. 2.
Magliveras, supra note 65, at 100.
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jeopardized the adoption of the entire Directive, a compromise was
reached, which led to the adoption of the "watered-down" version of
Article 2 calling for mere prohibition. 136 However, as previously
mentioned, the practical
effect of the prohibition was in fact "de facto"
37
criminalization. 1
Regarding the prevention approach, the First Directive incorporated
the 1990 FATF Recommendations under Articles 3 through 7.138 The
provisions of these articles introduced a series of obligations that
Member States were required to impose on credit and financial
institutions including: (1) the obligation "to identify customers and keep
records," (2) the obligation "to refrain from transactions they know or
suspect are linked with money laundering," (3) the obligation "not to tip
off customers that they are being investigated for money laundering,"
and (4) "a proactive duty to 39report suspicious transactions to the
competent national authorities." 1
The First Directive was to be implemented by Member States by
January 1, 1993, at the latest. 140 However, a majority of Member States
did not comply with this deadline.14 1 Interestingly, even countries which
had already promulgated relevant legislation before the adoption of the
Directive did not observe the deadline. 14 For example, the United
Kingdom did not incorporate the First Directive into national law until
after the deadline143 even though the 1986 Drug Trafficking Offenses
Act had already made the laundering of proceeds from drug trafficking a
criminal offense. 144 The First Directive was finally incorporated later in
1993 by virtue of the Criminal Justice Act and 1993 Money Laundering
136. Id. at 100-01.
137. Mitsilegas & Gilmore, supra note 3, at 136.
138. Id. at 120; see also Magliveras, supra note 65, at 102.
139. Mitsilegas & Gilmore, supra note 3, at 120; see also First Directive, supra note 125, at
arts. 3-7. Institutions must comply with the customer identification requirement when an account is
opened or a transaction is carried out exceeding ECU 15,000 (equal to $13,650 at that time) either in
a single operation or in separate operations that appeared to be "loosely connected." Magliveras,
supra note 65, at 102. Additionally, "the identification requirement is implemented when banks
check in detail the identity of customers (the so-called know your customer principle) and refrain
from opening anonymous or proxy accounts where the beneficiary's identity is not fully revealed."
Id. The Directive did not contain any "provisions regarding the nature, functions, and powers of
these [competent national] authorities." Mitsilegas & Gilmore, supra note 3, at 122. Member States
were given full discretion in the designation of such authorities, which has led to the development of
various different models of reporting systems within the EU. Id.
140. Mortman, supra note 54, at S435.
141. Magliveras, supra note 65, at 107.
142. Id. at 107.
143. Id.
144. See id. at 107 & n.74; Drug Trafficking Offenses Act, 1986, c. 32, § 24 (Eng.).
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Regulations. 145 Similarly, Belgium, by virtue of the Act of July 17, 1990,
introduced Article 505 to its Penal Code, which made intentional or
negligent money laundering a criminal offense. 146 The First Directive,
Money Laundering Act of January
however, was not adopted until the
147
11, 1993, was finally given effect.
The primary method of implementation opted for by most Member
States has been to amend their Penal Codes to "criminalize money
laundering and to promulgate separate legislation catering for the
substantive provisions of the Directive.' ' 148 This method was followed by
Germany, which introduced paragraph 261 to its Penal Code in 1992 via
the Act on impeding illegal drug trafficking and other forms of
organized crime1 49 and in 1993 incorporated the substantive provisions
of the Directive via the Act on the detection of proceeds from serious
crimes. 150
The First Directive stipulates that money launderers may only be
prosecuted if they know that the property given to them for conversion
was derived from committing or participating in a predicate offense.151
This means that in order for a money laundering case to succeed before
the courts, it must be proven that the charged money launderer had
"concrete knowledge" of the property's (that is, money's) "illicit
However, not all Member States have adhered to this strict
origin. '
requirement that the alleged money laundering operations must have
been "intentional" in order to be prosecuted. For example, the
implementing legislation in the Netherlands, Ireland, and the United
Kingdom also punish negligent money laundering. 1 53 Negligent money
laundering occurs where the charged money launderer merely had
reason to suspect that the proceeds he disguised were derived from the
defendant should
commission of a predicate offense. In other words, the
1 54
have suspected that he was disguising "dirty money.'
145. Magliveras, supra note 65, at 107; see also Criminal Justice Act, 1993, c. 36, § 93(A)
(Eng.).
146. Magliveras, supranote 65, at 107.
147. Id.
148. Id. The substantive provisions of the First Directive encompass the identification
requirement, the obligation to reveal to the competent authorities suspicious transactions, and the
tipping-off requirement. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.at 108.
151. First Directive, supra note 125, at art. I(C).
152. Magliveras, supra note 65, at 99.
153. Id. at 99-100; see, e.g., THE AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES: THE DUTCH
PENAL CODE 245 (Louise Rayar & Stafford Wadsworth trans., 1997).
154. Magliveras, supra note 65, at 100.
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"Second Directive"-CouncilDirective 2001/9 7/EC

Since issuing its first set of 40 Recommendations in 1990, the
FATF continued to monitor "trends and typologies in money
laundering," as well as the "legal and practical effect of its
Recommendations."' 55 By the mid-1990s, the FATF realized that the
"existing global anti-money laundering framework was not adequate to
address the changes in money laundering operations" created by
technological advances or the laundering of proceeds derived from non156 Therefore, in 1996 the FATF revised its
drug-related criminal activity.
157
40 Recommendations.

These revisions set forth numerous ways in which countries could
be more effective in their fight against money laundering. First, they
suggested that the list of predicate offenses for money laundering should
be expanded beyond drug-related criminal activity. Second, they
recommended that the customer identification system be updated in
order to take into account new technologies money launderers had been
using to sidestep the previous money laundering countermeasures.
Finally, they suggested that the obligations previously imposed only on
institutions within the financial sector also be imposed on other
institutions and individuals
that were vulnerable to being used for money
58
purposes.'
laundering
The latter group included lawyers. The FATF considered some
activities of lawyers particularly vulnerable to exploitation by money
launderers because lawyers have the ability to create "corporate vehicles,
establish trust arrangements, and provide financial advice in complex
transactions."' 159 Money launderers could also use lawyers' client
be hidden
accounts for "layering and concealing funds" that could
60
behind the veil of secrecy offered by the legal privilege.'
In 1999, these revisions led the European Commission to draft a
proposal for a second money laundering directive that would update the
161
First Directive by incorporating the FATF Revised Recommendations.

155.

Mitsilegas & Gilmore, supra note 3, at 122-23.

156. Id. at 123.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Shaughnessy, supra note 1, at 30.
160. Id.
161. Mitsilegas & Gilmore, supra note 3, at 123; see Commission Proposal for a European

Parliament and Council Directive amending Council Directive 91/308/EEC of June 1991 on
Prevention of the Use of the Financial System for the Purpose of Money Laundering, COM (1999)
352 final (July 19, 1999).
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In an explanatory memorandum, the Commission remarked on its high
regard for the FATF Recommendations, noting that:
Just as the 1991 Directive moved ahead of the original FATF 40
Recommendations in requiring obligatory suspicious transaction
reporting, the European Union should continue to impose a high
standard on its Member States, giving effect to or even going beyond
the 1996 update of the FATF 40 Recommendations. In particular the
EU can show the way in seeking to involve certain professions more
actively162in the fight against money laundering alongside the financial
sector.

However, negotiations for the Directive dragged on, due to
concerns by the European Parliament, which was co-legislating with the
Council of Ministers on the Directive. These concerns were based
mainly on how the extension of the First Directive's duties to the legal
profession would impact the right to a fair trial and the principle of
lawyer-client confidentiality.' 63 Immediately prior to the September 11th
terrorist attacks, the proposal for the Second Directive was in
conciliation, which would have signified the
expiration of the proposal if
64
an agreement had not been reached soon.
The September 11th terrorist attacks created a new urgency for
reaching an agreement in the sense that it became "politically correct to
support measures to strangle the channels for financing terrorism and
politically incorrect to appear to value self-serving professional interests
over the international goal of fighting terrorism."' 65 Finally, in late
November 2001, the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament
reached a compromise and Directive 2001/97/EC amending the First
Directive ("Second Directive") was adopted on December 4, 2001. 166

162. Explanatory Memorandum to the Commission Proposal for a European Parliament and
Council Directive amending Council Directive 91/308/EEC of June 1991 on Prevention of the Use
of the Financial System for the Purpose of Money Laundering, COM (1999) 352 final, at 2 (July 14,
1999), available
FIN:EN:PDF.

at

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:1999:0352:

163. Mitsilegas & Gilmore, supra note 3,at 123.
164. See id.
Conciliation is a formal legislative process whereby representatives of the Council
and an equal number of representatives from the Parliament form a Conciliation Committee
pursuant to Article 251(4) of the EU Treaty. The Committee is established when the two institutions

are unable to agree upon a final text. The Committee has six weeks to agree upon a text by a
qualified majority in the Council and by an absolute majority of the members of Parliament,
otherwise the proposal will be rejected. See EC Treaty, supranote 112, at art. 251(4).
165. Shaughnessy, supranote 1,at 30.

166. Id. at 31; see Council Directive 2001/97, amending Council Directive 91/308/EC On
Prevention of the Use of the Financial System for the Purpose of Money Laundering, 2001 O.J. (L
344) (EC) [hereinafter Second Directive].
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In line with the revised 40 Recommendations, the Second Directive
brought about an extension of the predicate offenses to include serious
crime. Not only does it include traditional serious crime, but it also lists
serious fraud, corruption, and any "offence which may generate
substantial proceeds and which is punishable by a severe sentence 167
of
imprisonment in accordance with the penal law of the Member State."
Furthermore, the Second Directive still allows the Member States to
168
designate any other criminal offense as a predicate offense.
Additionally, the applicable scope of the Second Directive was extended
to impose the duties prescribed by the First Directive on auditors,
notaries, external accountants and tax advisors, estate agents, art dealers,
and casinos, as well as lawyers and other independent legal
professionals, when they are engaged in a series of specified financial
activities. 169
The Second Directive had two basic requirements relating to
identification and disclosure. 70 The identification provision imposes a
more stringent application of the identification requirements underlying
the know-your-customer principle on individuals and entities subject to
the Second Directive, in that they are required to perform a due diligence
investigation upon all their clients
and establish a client's identity "by
171
means of supporting evidence."'
Subject entities and individuals must only impose these
identification requirements upon the occurrence of certain triggering
events including: (1) when entering into a business relationship with a
new client; (2) when opening a client account; (3) when offering safe
custody facilities; or (4) when any transaction involves C15,000 or
more. 172 However, if the entity or individual has reason to suspect that
the client is involved in money laundering, then the client identification
requirements must be carried out regardless of whether they have been
triggered by any of the enumerated occurrences. 173 The Second Directive
seemed most concerned about the risks of money laundering in nonface-to-face transactions, and in such situations required that all entities
and individuals subject to the Directive take "specific and adequate

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Second Directive, supra note 166, at art. I(E).
Id.
Id. at art. 2a.
Shaughnessy, supra note 1, at 32.
Second Directive, supra note 166, at art. 3(1).
Id.at art. 3(1)-(2).
Id.at art. 3(8).
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measures," such as requiring additional documentary 4evidence and
7
certifications, in order to ensure the identity of the client. 1
The disclosure provision required that subject entities and
individuals inform the appropriate authorities "of any fact which might
be an indication of money laundering," and, upon request, provide those
authorities with all necessary information, which in essence meant the
filing of STRs.175 However, the language of the Second Directive setting
forth the appropriate standard of awareness that should trigger the 1filing
76
of such a report deviates from that of the FATF Recommendations.
The FATF Recommendations set forth two possible options for
determining when a STR should be filed. The first option establishes an
objective standard by using the terminology "suspect or have reasonable
grounds to suspect"'177 and the second option establishes a subjective
standard by using the term "suspect."' 78 The Second Directive requires
disclosure "of any fact which might be an indication of money
laundering," which establishes an even broader
objective standard than
79
set forth by the FATF Recommendations.
In contrast to the United States, licensed attorneys in Europe do not
have a monopoly to practice law. Because lawyers make up only a small
portion of the large class of professionals who are legally authorized to
perform many of the same legal services as lawyers, they face extensive
competition from accounting firms, notaries, and other service providers
working in multidisciplinary practices. Therefore, the Second Directive
uses the intentionally broad term "independent legal professionals", 80 in
order to include any professional who provides legal services. 181
However, most Member States regulate the legal professionals who
are not bound to the client by a relationship of employment differently
than those lawyers who are bound to their client by a relationship of
employment, such as in-house counsel. 182 Accordingly, the European
Court of Justice has determined, due to this common distinction
174. Id. at art. 3(11).
175. Id. at art. 6(l)(a)-(b).
176. Id. But see FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE ON MONEY LAUNDERING, THE FORTY
RECOMMENDATIONS,
rec.
15
(Sept.
1,
1996),
available at
http://www.fatfgafi.org/dataoecd/1 5/51/40262612.pdf [hereinafter FATF 1996 FORTY RECOMMENDATIONS].
177. FATF SPECIAL RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 80, at rec. 4; see also FATF
CONSULTATION PAPER, supranote 82, § 3.7.3.2.
178. FATF 1996 FORTY RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 176, at rec. 15; see also FATF
CONSULTATION PAPER, supranote 82, § 3.7.3.2.
179. Second Directive, supra note 166, at art. 6(1)(a).

180. Id. at art. 2(5).
181.

Shaughnessy, supra note 1, at 36.

182. Id. at37.
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prevalent in most Member States, that the principle of lawyer-client
confidentiality should only apply to lawyers regulated by Member State
bar associations as well as any legal professional who is not employed
by or who is independent of his client. This distinction excludes
European in-house counsels from the scope of the Second Directive. 183
To ease the concerns of the European Parliament that the Second
Directive's reporting obligations would have an adverse effect on the
principle of lawyer-client confidentiality with devastating implications
for the concept of a fair trial, it provides for the possibility of exempting
lawyers from certain obligations to report suspicious transactions and to
refrain

from

tipping

off.184 However,

these

exemptions are

not

obligatory, and the Second Directive allows Member States broad
discretion in the implementation of the obligations
regarding notaries
85
and other independent legal professionals. 1
The Second Directive recognizes the need for lawyer-client
confidentiality and provides for two exemptions to the disclosure
requirements. First, the Directive allows Member States to exempt
lawyers from disclosing any information "obtained either before, during
or after judicial proceedings, or in the course of ascertaining the legal
position for a client."' 86 However, it seeks to subject lawyers to its
provisions when they engage in activities especially vulnerable to money
laundering, such as when "participating 1in
financial or corporate
87
advice."'
tax
providing
including
transactions,
More specifically, the Second Directive subjects lawyers to its
provisions when they assist "inthe planning or execution of transactions
for their clients concerning the:" (1) "buying and selling of real property
or business entities;" (2) the "managing of client money, securities or
183.

See Case 155/79, AM & S Europe Ltd. v. Commission, 1982 E.C.R. 1575, 1611-12

(finding that the legal privilege applicable to EC proceedings was limited to lawyers who were
members of a Member State Bar Association and who were independent from their client, thereby
excluding in-house lawyers); see also FOLSOM, supra note 104, at 289-90 (stating that the European

Court of Justice in AM & S held that written communications with in-house counsel as well as
communications with non-EU counsel-lawyers who are not licensed EU attomeys-are not
subject to the legal privilege and therefore are not exempt from disclosure); FATF CONSULTATION
PAPER, supra note 82, § 5.4, 280 (noting that the FATF recommendations intend to cover only
"independent legal professionals," defined as "lawyers and legal professionals that are licensed or
admitted to practice and who work in law firms or are self-employed").
184.
185.
186.
187.

Mitsilegas & Gilmore, supra note 3, at 124.
Id.
Second Directive, supra note 166, at recital 17.
Id. at recital 16. Given the background of the Directive and reading it as a whole, it

becomes clear the word "participating" in this context refers to situations where the lawyer assists a
client in money laundering transactions rather than actually participates in them. Shaughnessy,
supra note 1,at 37.
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other assets;" (3) the "opening or management of bank, savings or
securities accounts;" (4) the "organisation of contributions necessary for
the creation, operation or management of companies;" and (5) the
"creation, operation or management of trusts, companies or similar
structures, or by acting on1 88behalf of and for their client in any financial
or real estate transaction."
Second, the Directive allows Member States to exempt lawyers
from the disclosure requirements of the Directive when they are
"ascertaining the legal position of a client" or when they are
"representing a client in legal proceedings." 89 These exemptions,
however, only apply to the disclosure requirements of suspicious
transaction reporting and tipping-off. They therefore do not relieve
lawyers of the know-your-client identification requirements.' 90
Two general problems, however, arise from the wording used in the
exemption provisions, including how to define what is meant by
legal/judicial proceedings' 9l and how to interpret the phrase
"ascertaining the legal position for their client," and whether it should
include giving general legal advice.' 92 The CCBE has taken the view
that this exemption should apply to giving general legal advice and has
accordingly advised its Member bar associations to encourage their
national governments
to adopt this broad interpretation of the
93
exemption.'
However, even under the CCBE's broad interpretation, the
exemptions from disclosure are not applicable in three instances: (1)
when a lawyer participates in money-laundering; (2) when legal advice
is provided for the purpose of laundering money; or (3) when the lawyer
"knows that the client [seeks] legal advice for money laundering
purposes."' 194 Nevertheless, problems arise in determining the lawyer's
requisite knowledge. The definition of the substantive offense of money
laundering in Article I(C) sets forth a standard of "knowing," but also
states that such knowledge may be "inferred from objective factual

188.

Second Directive, supra note 166, at art. 2(5)(a)-(b).

189.

Id. at recital 17.

190.

Shaughnessy, supra note 1, at 38.

191. Id.
192. Id. at 39; see also COUNCIL OF BARS AND LAW SOC'YS OF EUR., ACTION POINTS FOR EU
BARS AND LAW SOCIETIES ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MONEY LAUNDERING DIRECTIVE,

Action
Point
11(a)
(Jan.
31,
2002),
available
at
http://www.ccbe.org/
index.php?id=94&idcomite=20&L=0 [hereinafter CCBE ACTION POINTS].
193. Shaughnessy, supra note 1, at 39; see also CCBE ACTION POINTS, supra note 192, at
Action Point 11(a).

194.

Second Directive, supranote 166, at recital 17 (emphasis added).
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circumstances."1' 95 On the other hand, the language in the provision
setting forth the three instances in which the exemptions for lawyers are
inapplicable in Recital 17, provides that the requisite knowledge is when
"the lawyer 'knows"' without specifying whether such knowledge may
be inferred from the objective, subjective, or any other kind of factual
circumstances. 196 It would seem that the definition of the substantive
offense requires that the lawyer's knowledge be considered from an
objective perspective, while the recital requires that the lawyer's
"actual
97
knowledge" be considered from a subjective perspective.'
The Second Directive itself does not provide any support for an
interpretation that would make the objectively inferable knowledge
standard in the definition article applicable to other provisions.
Accordingly, the definition article's objective knowledge standard
should not be transferred to Recital 17's provisions for determining
when the exemptions from reporting are inapplicable and the advice
given by the lawyer is no longer subject to the principle of professional
secrecy. 98 In other words, the lawyer should only have to file a STR if
he has actual knowledge that the client he is representing in legal
proceedings or for whom he is ascertaining the legal position is seeking
legal advice for money laundering purposes.
However, such an interpretation could be detrimental to lawyers
and other independent legal professionals. Once the lawyer's activities
for a certain client fall within the reporting exemptions, the lawyer is
under no obligation to report his client unless he has actual knowledge
of his client's offense. However, the lawyer could still be charged with
aiding money laundering if he should have known that his client was
engaged in money laundering, even if he did not have actual knowledge
of the offense.' 99

In some respects, the provision removing a lawyer from the
exemption to report when he knows that the client is seeking to launder
money is analogous to the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client
privilege under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("MRPC") in
the United States. °0 MRPC section 1.6 provides an exception to the
Rule of Confidentiality that permits the lawyer to "reveal information
relating to the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer

195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

Id. at art. I(C) (emphasis added).
Id. at recital 17; Shaughnessy, supra note 1, at 39.
Shaughnessy, supranote 1, at 39.
CCBE ACTION POINTS, supranote 192, at Action Point 11(b).
Shaughnessy, supranote 1,at 40.
See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2).
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reasonably believes necessary" to "prevent the client from committing a
crime or fraud that is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to
the financial interests or property of another and in furtherance of which
the client has used or is using the lawyer's services., 20 1 However, under
this rule the lawyer is not required to report the misconduct of his client.
may reveal
Comment 7 to the rule plainly states that while the lawyer
2
the client's misconduct, he is under no obligation to do so. 02
C.

"ThirdDirective "-CouncilDirective 2005/60/EC

In 2004, the European Commission drafted a proposal for a third
Directive, amending the two earlier texts.20 3 The main justification for
this proposal was the need to bring EC law up to date with the new work
done by the FATF, which following September 11 th, was extended to
cover not only money laundering, but also terrorist finance. 2° This
approach is reflected in a series of Eight Special Recommendations that
the FATF adopted in 2001. In 2003, the FATF issued a revision of its
original 40 Recommendations and in October 2004 a ninth measure was
added to the previously promulgated additional Eight Special
Recommendations.2 5
The negotiations between the Council and the European Parliament
ultimately were less difficult than they were in the case of the Second
Directive, and agreement was reached almost immediately.0 6 Council
Directive 2005/60/EC on the prevention of the use of the financial
system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing
("Third Directive") was published in November 2005 and effectively
repealed the earlier Directives.20 7
The deadline for national implementation of the Third Directive
was set for December 15, 2007. The Third Directive consolidated the
previous two Money Laundering Directives and brought the European

201. Id.
202. Id. at cmt. 7.
203. See European Commission Proposal for Directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council on the Prevention of the Use of the Financial System for the Purpose of Money Laundering

Including Terrorist Financing, COM (2004) 448 final (June 30, 2004) [hereinafter Third Directive
Proposal].
204. Id. at recital 5.
205.

FIN.

ACTION

TASK FORCE,

ANNUAL

REPORT:

2004-05

3

(June

10,

2005),

http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/41/25/34988062.pdf.
206. Mitsilegas & Gilmore, supranote 3, at 125.
207. Council Directive 2005/60, On the Prevention of the Use of the Financial System for the
Purpose of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, 2005 O.J. (L 309) (EC) [hereinafter Third
Directive].
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Legislation up-to-date with the 40+9 Recommendations made by the
FATF. The objective of complying with international standards is again
reflected in the Preamble, with specific references to the threat from
terrorism, 20 8 the need to take into account the work of the FATF, 20 9 and

the need to change customer identification provisions in light of
international developments.21 0
A number of changes from the previous two directives involve the
criminal law-related aspects of the Third Directive. While the Third
Directive also states that money laundering is prohibited, the definition
of money laundering was amended to align the definition of serious
crime in the Directive with the one in the 2001 Framework Decision on
Confiscation and now also prohibits terrorist financing. 21' The definition
of terrorist financing is similar to the one found in the 1999 UN
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, 212 and
"terrorism is formulated in accordance
with the relevant EU Framework
2 13
Decision" on combating terrorism.
Other major changes have been introduced in the field of customer
identification and due diligence. Chapter II of the Third Directive, now
entitled "Customer Due Diligence," is comprised of fifteen articles that
have, for the most part, been expanded from the earlier texts. 21 4 "The
provisions on customer identification have been expanded to introduce
various levels of diligence," which apply varying degrees of due
diligence measures on a risk-sensitive basis.2 15
The greatest change regarding the reporting duties has been the
inclusion of express provisions covering Financial Intelligence Units
("FIUs"). "Member States are asked to establish FIUs with specific
tasks," and ensure that "the units are given maximum powers of access
208. Id. at recital 1.
209. Id. at recital 5.
210. Id.at recital 9.
211. Mitsilegas & Gilmore, supra note 3, at 126. Compare Third Directive, supra note 207, at
art. 3(5)(a), (f), with Council Framework Decision 2001/500/JHA, art. l(b), 2001 O.J. (L 182) 1
(EC).
212. Mitsilegas & Gilmore, supra note 3, at 126. Terrorist financing within the meaning of the
Third Directive is defined as:
provision or collection of funds, by any means, directly or indirectly, with the intention
that they should be used or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in full or in part, in
order to carry out any of the offences within the meaning of Articles 1 to 4 of Council
Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism.

Third Directive, supra note 207, at art. 1(4).
213. Mitsilegas & Gilmore, supranote 3, at126.
214. Id. at 126 (citing Third Directive, supra note 207, at arts. 6-19).
215. Third Directive, supra note 207, at arts. 8(2), 13(1); Mitsilegas & Gilmore, supra note 3,
at 127.
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to national databases. 2 16 Under the Third Directive, STRs are viewed
within the specific context of the FlUs, since the institutions and persons
involved are now required to send STRs directly to the FIU rather than
the previously designated appropriate authority.2 17 This procedure for
STR filing also applies to the case of legal professionals.2 18
Furthermore, the circumstances under which the obligation to
report is triggered has been amended to read that institutions and persons
subject to the Third Directive must promptly inform "the FIU, on their
own initiative, where the institution or person ...knows, suspects or has
reasonable grounds to suspect that money laundering
or terrorist
219
financing is being or has been committed or attempted.,
"On the subject of lawyers, the [exemptions] from reporting duties
remain[] .,,220 But, "an important change has been made to the 'tipping
off provision," now set forth in Article 28.221 The possibility of Member
States exempting lawyers from this obligation has been deleted, since it
was not considered to be in line with the Revised FATF
Recommendations.22 2 Instead, Article 28(6) now states that where
lawyers "seek to dissuade a client from engaging in illegal activity, this
will not constitute tipping off within the meaning of the [Third]
Directive., 223 Another change to the tipping-off provision has been to
include the prohibition of disclosure to the client or third party that an
investigation "may be carried out. ' 224 Thus, a potential loophole has
been closed off since previously the no-tipping-off provision was
limited
225
to situations in which an investigation was already underway.
The new blanket prohibition on tipping-off also poses a complex
array of problems for European and American lawyers working in
European branch offices of American law firms. Lawyers operating in
Europe find themselves in a difficult position with their American
colleagues when faced with an obligation to file an STR against a
common client. Since tipping-off is prohibited, the lawyer may not
216. Third Directive, supra note 207, at art. 21; Mitsilegas & Gilmore, supra note 3 at 127.
217. Mitsilegas & Gilmore, supra note 3, at 127.
218. Id.

219. Third Directive, supra note 207, at art. 22(1)(a) (emphasis added).
220. Mitsilegas & Gilmore, supra note 3, at 127; see also Third Directive, supra note 207, at
art. 23(2).

221. Mitsilegas & Gilmore, supra note 3, at 127-28.
222. Third Directive Proposal, supra note 203, at 6; Mitsilegas & Gilmore, supra note 3, at
128.
223.

Mitsilegas & Gilmore, supra note 3, at 128; see also Third Directive, supra note 207, at

art. 28(6).
224. Third Directive, supra note 207, at art. 28(1); Mitsilegas & Gilmore, supranote 3, at 128.
225. Mitsilegas & Gilmore, supra note 3, at 128.
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disclose to the client that an STR has been filed. Additionally, he may
not tell his American colleagues that he was obligated to file an STR
because in the United States, the client's lawyer would be required to
disclose that fact to the client,2 26 and this would be a violation of all
national legislation implementing the Third Directive.
V.

IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTS OF THE MONEY-LAUNDERING
DIRECTIVE IN THE EU MEMBER STATES

In the United States, the concept of lawyer-client confidentiality is
client-centered in that it is based in large part on the individual client's
need for effective representation.227 This effective representation
requires that a lawyer be fully informed of all facts of the matter he is
handling. 22 A client who knows that his lawyer will keep his
information confidential will feel more inclined to disclose all relevant
facts of his matter to the lawyer. Furthermore, by knowing all the facts
of a client's matter, the lawyer is in a better position to persuade the
client to do the right thing, which is also a socially desirable corollary of
being able to establish a relationship of trust and confidence with the
client.229
Similarly, in the EU, the legal privilege is justified as an essential
component of the right of defense 230 and as an important aspect of
individual freedom and privacy. 23 1 Even though the regulation of the
legal privilege and the ethical rules regarding confidentiality vary
significantly among Member States, a common understanding of the
legal privilege has evolved within the EU as it continues to intensify and
extend its integration.232 On several occasions the European Court of
Human Rights has found some aspects of the legal privilege to be

226.
227.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4(a)(3), 1.4(b).
MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS 129 (3d ed.

2004).
228. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (stating that "[the] purpose [of
the attomey-client privilege] is to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and
their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and
administration ofjustice").
229. FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 227, at 130.
230. Case 155/79, AM & S Europe Ltd. v. Commission, 1982 E.C.R. 1575, 1611 (calling the
privilege "an essential corollary" to the right of defense).
231. See, e.g., Case 309/99, Wouters v. Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van
Advocaten, 2001 E.C.R. 1-1577, 1-1631 (Opinion of Advocate General Leger) (stating that
"[p]rofessional secrecy also constitutes an 'essential guarantee of the freedom of the individual and
of the proper working ofjustice').
232. Id. at 1-1630; see also supra text accompanying notes 34-49.
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protected under the European Human Rights Convention.233
Furthermore, in 2000, the Council of Europe noted that lawyers must be
able to counsel their clients in private in an adopted recommendation on
the freedom of exercise of the profession of lawyers.234
However, since neither the European Court of Human Rights nor
the Council of Europe are proper institutions of the EU,235 the fact that
the European Court of Justice has recognized the legal privilege as a
general principle of law is even more significant.23 6 Even though the
procedures and methods of the European Court of Justice are solidly
based upon civil law traditions, it has emerged as a powerful lawmaker
and main interpreter of the EU's founding treaties.237 The court's lawmaking role becomes most evident when it recognizes general principles
of law, which can be construed as an evolving body of general EU
common law. 238 Accordingly, since the court has recognized the legal
privilege as a general principle of law, the directives should be
interpreted in a manner that is compatible with that general principle.
The most recent opinion of the European Court of Justice, in June
2007, held that advice and assistance given by lawyers in financial and
real estate transactions that had no link with judicial proceedings were
not exempt from the duty to cooperate in combating money
laundering.2 39 According to Article 234 of the EC Treaty, the European
Court of Justice has jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings on the
interpretation of the Treaty as well as the validity and interpretation of
acts by the Union's Institutions, such as the money-laundering Directive
in this case, when requested by a national court or tribunal.240 In the

233. See, e.g., Niemietz v. Germany, 251 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 36 (1992) (noting that "an
encroachment on professional secrecy may have repercussions on the proper administration of
justice and hence on the rights guaranteed by Article 6 of the Convention [on Human Rights]");
Campbell v. United Kingdom, 233 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 16 (1992) (applying Article 8 of the
European Convention on Human Rights to protect correspondence between a prisoner and his
lawyer); S. v. Switzerland, 220 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 14 (1991) (applying Article 6 of the
European Convention on Human Rights to the right to effectively consult a lawyer).
234. Council of Eur., Recommendation No. R(2000)21 of the Committee of Ministers to
Member States on the Freedom of Exercise of the Profession of Lawyer, Principle 1(5) (Oct. 25,
2000),
https://wcd.coe.int/com.instranet.InstraServlet?command=com.instranet.CmdBlobGet&
Instranetlmage=533749&SecMode=l &Docld=370286&Usage=2 (last visited Feb. 5, 2009).
235. FOLSOM, supra note 104, at 58.
236. See supranote 231.
237.

FOLSOM, supra note 104, at 54-55.

238. Id. at 55.
239. Case C-305/05, Ordre des Barreaux Francophones et Germanophones v. Conseil des
Ministres,
2007
E.C.R.
1-05305,
33,
available
at
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62005J0305:EN:HTML.
240.

EC Treaty, supra note 112, at art. 234.
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underlying case, the request for the preliminary ruling originated from
the Cour d'arbitrage (now the Cour Constitutionnelle) in Belgium and
involved a question concerning the interpretation of Article 2a(5) of the
Second Directive, which effectively extended the obligations imposed
by the Directive to notaries and independent legal professionals.2 41
The claimants, consisting of the Association of the French-speaking
and German-speaking Bars, the French Bar Association of Brussels, the
society of Flemish Bars, and the Dutch Bar Association of Brussels,
applied for the annulment of certain articles of Belgian law
242 Teca
implementing the Second Directive.
The claimants argued that the
Belgian law implementing the Second Directive infringed on the Belgian
Constitution and on Article 6 of the European Human Rights
Convention, 243 in that the obligation on lawyers to report a client's
suspicious activities unjustifiably encroached upon2 44the principle of
professional secrecy and the independence of lawyers.
The referring court held that since the Belgian law was based upon
a Council Directive, it was first necessary to ascertain whether that
Directive was lawful.2 45 Accordingly, the question it posed the European
Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling was whether Article 2a(5) of the
Second Directive infringed on the right to a fair trial guaranteed by
Article 6 of the European Human Rights Convention.24 6
The court held that, since the question referred was confined to the
legality of the Second Directive in reference to the right to a fair trial, it
could not consider other rights such as the respect for privacy provided
for in Article 8 of the European Human Rights Convention. 247 Article 6
of the Convention, entitled "Right to a Fair Trial," provides in pertinent
part:
(1) In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of
any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair
and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent
and impartial tribunal established by law....
(2) Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be

241.

Reference for a Preliminary Ruling from the Cour d'Arbitrage (Belg.), 2005 O.J. (C 243)

15.
242. Case 305/05, Ordre des Barreaux, 2.
243. See id. 12. Even though the ECHR has been ratified by all EU member states
individually, the EU as an institution has not acceded to it. However, the ECJ has previously

recognized and drawn upon the Convention in its rulings. See FOLSOM, supra note 104, at 58.
244. Case 305/05, Ordre des Barreaux, 12.
245. Id 15.
246.
247.

Id. 16.
Id,
17, 19.
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presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.
(3) Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the
following minimum rights:
(a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he
understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him;
(b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation
of his defence;
(c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance
of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to
pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the
interests ofjustice so require;
(d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him
and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses
on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses
against him;
(e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if24 he
cannot
8
understand or speak the language used in court.
The court acknowledged that lawyers would be unable to
satisfactorily carry out their tasks of advising, defending, and
representing their clients in the context of judicial proceedings or the
preparation for such proceedings if the lawyers were obliged to
cooperate with the authorities by passing them information obtained in
the course of legal consultations with their clients. 249 Furthermore, such
an interpretation of the Second Directive would ultimately deprive
potential clients of the rights conferred on them by Article 6 of the
European Human Rights Convention.250
However, the Court of Justice maintains that lawyers are only
subject to the obligations laid down in the Second Directive when
participating in certain transactions-particularly ones of a financial
nature or involving real estate, listed in Article 2a(5)(a) of that
Directive. 251 The court held that since the Article 2a(5) activities took
place in a context with no link to judicial proceedings, they fell outside
the scope of the right to a fair trial.2 52
Furthermore, the court held that a lawyer advising a client on one of
the transactions listed in Article 2a(5) will be exempt from such

248.
Protocol
249.
250.
251.
252.

Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, amended by

11, art. 6, Nov. 4, 1950, Europ. T.S. No. 5.
Case 305/05, Ordre des Barreaux,
Id.
Id. 33.
Id.

32.
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reporting duties as soon as he assists in defending or representing the
client before the courts in regard to that transaction. 253 He will also be
exempt from the reporting obligations if the same client were to request
legal advice about instituting or avoiding judicial proceedings regarding
that transaction.2 54 The court emphasized that this exemption from the
obligation to report is set forth in Article 6(3) of the Second Directive
and applies regardless of whether the information was received or
obtained before, during, or after the proceedings. 5 Thus, as soon as the
lawyer is called upon by his client to represent him in court and the
matter is no longer of a mere transactional nature, all information
between the lawyer and that client remains confidential, and the lawyer
is not subject to any reporting obligations.
Therefore, the court concluded that obligations to inform and
cooperate with the authorities responsible for combating money
laundering as set forth in Article 6(1), and imposed on lawyers by
Article 2a(5) of the Directive did not infringe on the right to a fair trial
as guaranteed by Article 6 of the European Convention on Human
Rights.256 Even though the court did not explicitly address whether the
Second Directive impinged on the principle of professional secrecy, the
right to a fair trial is inextricably linked to issues of confidentiality and
trust between a client and his lawyer. So, by way of implication, the
court may have also already addressed this issue as well.
A.

NationalLegislation Implementing the Directive

Since the national implementation of directives is ultimately at the
discretion of the Member States, different approaches regarding the
transposition of money laundering legislation within the EU have
evolved.25 7 However, the integration methods are subject to ultimate
review by the European Court of Justice in the event they are
challenged.258 Currently the most drastic differences among countries
include: (1) "the manner in which the crime of money laundering is
expressed;" (2) "how professional privilege exceptions are determined;"
(3) "how suspicious activity reports are permitted to be made;" (4) "the
253. Id. 34.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id. 37.
257. IBA, Anti-Money Laundering Legislation Implementation Group-Attends on the DG
Internal Markets and Services Division of the European Commission: Summary of Meeting (Oct.
16, 2006).
258. Shaughnessy, supra note 1, at 35.
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process of verification of
non-face to face transactions;" and (5) the
59
"tipping off provisions."
Even though the national implementation deadline of the Third
Directive was set for December 15, 2007, few countries met this
deadline.260 While the Third Directive repealed the Second Directive, it
builds on the previous Directives and does not significantly alter the
substantive obligations imposed on the legal profession. Since all
directives become directly applicable after the implementation date has
passed, the Third Directive is in effect in all Member States even if it has
not yet been transposed into national law. 26 1 Therefore, since the Third
Directive does not substantively alter many of the provisions
implemented through the Second Directive, but merely adds onto the
existing framework, the legislation implementing the Second Directive
is still relevant in as much as it implements those provisions of the
Second Directive that have not been altered by the Third Directive.26 2
Regarding the Second Directive, Member States were required to
implement national legislation transposing the Directive by no later than
June 15, 2003.263 However, many Member States did not observe this
deadline, especially in regards to the obligations imposed on the legal
profession. 264 Only six of the then fifteen Member States including
Denmark, Germany, Finland, the Netherlands, Ireland, and Spain were
successful in implementing the Second Directive either before the
deadline or shortly thereafter.265 Austria, Belgium, and the United
Kingdom implemented the Directive by the end of 2003 after the
opening of infringement proceedings by the European Commission. 66
The ten Member States that joined the EU in 2004 either had appropriate
259. News Release, IBA, IBA Urges Caution in the Implementation of the Third EU Money
at
http://www.anti2007),
available
2
(July
2,
Directive,
at
Laundering
moneylaundering.org/AboutAML.aspx#comments.
260. Third Directive, supra note 207, at art. 45. As of June 2008 the EU was pursuing
infringement actions against fifteen member states, including Belgium, the Czech Republic,
Germany, Greece, Spain, Finland, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland,
Portugal, Sweden, and Slovakia for failing to adopt and implement the Third EU Money Laundering
Directive into national law by the stipulated deadline. IBA Anti-Money Laundering Forum, The
http://www.antiCompliance:
Germany,
and
Guide
to
Legislation
Lawyer's
moneylaundering.org/europe/germany.aspx (last visited Jan. 11, 2009) [hereinafter Implementation
of the Third Directive: Germany].
261. See supra text accompanying notes 203-19; see also supra note 113 and accompanying
text.
262. Commission Staff Working Document, supra note 34, 2.
263. Mitsilegas & Gilmore, supra note 3, at 124.
264. Commission Staff Working Document, supra note 34, 7.
265. Id. 7.
266. Id.
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legislation in place by then 267 or put such legislation in place soon
afterwards.26 8 Greece finally implemented national legislation in
December 2005, while France and Italy did so in 2006.269
1. Germany
Germany was among the few countries that observed the deadline
for implementation of the Second Directive, which has been in force
since August 14, 2002. The relevant legislation can be found under the
Money Laundering Act in the version of the Act on the Improvement of
the Suppression of Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of
Terrorism of August 8, 2002.270 In Germany, tipping-off was not
permitted under the Second Directive. 271 According to Section 11 of the
Money Laundering Act, lawyers shall not disclose to their clients or to
third persons that information has been transmitted to the authorities or
that a money laundering investigation is being carried out. 272 However, it
was not forbidden under Section 11 to give general legal advice.273
In 2004, three German lawyers challenged the national law
implementing the Second Directive by appealing their criminal
convictions before the German Constitutional Court sitting in Criminal
Matters. 274 The trial court had sentenced all three lawyers to nine months
in jail not only for having ignored their duty to report their suspicions
concerning their clients' transactions, but also for having accepted
payments which they knew had been received through the money
laundering practices of their clients.2 75 The main reason for the strict
sentence was that according to the court, the defendants not only
neglected to perform their duty, they actively participated in the crime
by accepting the "dirty money., 276 Accordingly, the trial court held that
267. Id.(Cyprus, Estonia, Hungry, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovak Republic, and
Slovenia).
268. Id. (the Czech Republic).
269. Id.
270. Gesetz zur Verbesserung der Bekampfirng der Geldwasche und der Bekampfung der
Finanzierung des Terrorismus, Geldwdschebekampfungsgesetz
[GwBekG] [Anti-Money
Laundering Act], Aug. 14, 2002, BGBI. I at3105 (F.R.G.).
271. COUNCIL OF BARS AND LAW SOC'YS OF EUR., OVERVIEW OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE 2001 MONEY LAUNDERING DIRECTIVE, question 2, § 7 (Mar. 2004), available at

http://www.ccbe.org/fileadmin/userupload/NTCdocument/mld

implementationp _

1183722950.pdf [hereinafter CCBE OVERVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION].
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Mar. 30, 2004, 110

Entscheidung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 226,
275.

Id.

1(F.R.G.) [hereinafter BVerfGE].

34, 40.

276. Id. 86.
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any lawyer who accepts remuneration, which he knows to have been
generated by one of the predicate offenses listed in Section 261 of the
Penal Code pertaining to money laundering, can be charged with and
found guilty of money laundering.277
The defendants, who are all defense attorneys, mainly argued that
this law impinges on their constitutional right to freely exercise their
professions as well as on the basic principles underlying the criminal
defense system, namely the principle of professional secrecy and by
implication, the right to a fair trial.278 The Constitutional Court, after
lengthy and careful analysis, rejected the constitutional arguments, but
rendered the statute virtually meaningless by holding that defense
attorneys could be subject to criminal charges for money laundering only
if they knew with absolute certainty that the origin of their compensation
was derived from money-laundering operations at the time they accepted
the compensation for their services. 279 The court further held that this
interpretation was within the public interest because it would guard
against lawyers being used by their clients to further illegal objectives
without impinging on the principle of professional secrecy.280
Even though a first governmental draft was published on October
11, 2007, and the lower House of the German Parliament (Bundestag)
passed a new proposal amending this first draft by October 27, 2007,
Germany did not transpose the Third Directive by the stipulated
December 15, 2007, deadline. 281 As a result, the European Commission
began pursuing infringement proceedings against Germany, as reported
on June 5, 2008.282 A month later, the draft proposal was finally
reviewed by the upper house of Parliament that represents the German
states (Bundesrat) 283 and a final version of the draft was adopted on
August 13, 2008.284

277.
(Stephan
278.
279.
280.
281.

Id. 41; see also THE AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES: GERMANY 151
Thaman trans., 2002).
BVerfGE, supra note 274, $T 61-62.
Id. 143.
Id. 145.
Implementation of the Third Directive: Germany, supra note 260.

282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Gesetz zur Fortentwicklung der Bekampfung der Geldwasche und der Bekampfung der
Terrorismusfinanzierung, Geldw8schebek~impfungsergtinzungsgesetz [GwBekErgG] [The Act on
the Further Development of the Fight Against Money Laundering and the Fight Against Terrorist
Financing], Aug. 13, 2008, BGBI. I at 1690 (F.R.G.).
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2. Spain
Spain was one of the two countries that transposed the Second
Directive into national law only shortly after the official deadline
without needing additional convincing from the European Commission.
Accordingly, the Second Directive has been implemented since July 5,
2003, by the law 19/2003, of July 4, 2003, "sobre r6gimen juridico de
los movimientos de capitales y de las transacciones econ6micas con el
exterior y sobre determinadas medidas de prevenci6n del blanqueo de
capitales. ''285 The law presents amendments to the previous Spanish
legislation.28 6
Spain is currently reviewing its legislation for the purposes of
implementing the Third Directive.
The Spanish Government has drafted a document entitled "technical
basis," which is [still] awaiting approval from the Ministry of Finance.
Once the "technical basis" document is approved, a 'political decision'
must be made in order to draw up a draft bill [that will] be sent to the
Spanish Parliament for approval.
However, several factors may further postpone implementation of the
Third Directive.288 First, due to the difficulty of reaching an agreement
between Spain's various agencies, the "political decision" has been
postponed. 89 Second, due to the recent presidential elections, the next
Parliament and Government have not yet been formed.29 °
3. Belgium
Only after the European Commission initiated infringement
proceedings did Belgium transpose the Second Directive, which was
implemented by the Law of January 12, 2004.291 This law effectively
amended the law of January 11, 1993, on the Prevention of the Use of

285. Act on the Movement of Capital and External Economic Transactions and Money
Laundering Countermeasures (B.O.E. 160) (2003) (Spain).
286. Decree Modifying Regulation 19/1993 of Dec. 28, 1993 on the Prevention of Money
Laundering (B.O.E. 19) (2005) (Spain).
287. IBA Anti-Money Laundering Forum, The Lawyer's Guide to Legislation and
Compliance: Spain, http://www.anti-moneylaundering.org/europe/spain.aspx (last visited Jan. 11,
2009).
288. Id.
289. Id.

290. Id.
291.

See supra text accompanying note 266; see also IBA Anti-Money Laundering Forum, The

Lawyer's
Guide
to
Legislation
and
Compliance:
Belgium,
http://www.antimoneylaundering.org/europe/Belgium.aspx (last visited Jan. 11,2009) [hereinafter Implementation
of the Third Directive: Belgium].
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the Financial System for the Purpose of Money Laundering, the law of
March 22, 1993, on the Status and the Role of the Credit Institutions,
and the law of April 6, 1995, on the Status of Investment Companies and
their Supervision, Intermediaries, and Advisers.292 It was this law that
was challenged by various Belgian Bar Associations before the Cour
d'arbitrage and referred to the Court of Justice for a preliminary
ruling.293
On April 27, 2007, the anti-money laundering statute of January 11,
1993, was amended by the Loi Programme or Programmawet ("Program
Statute"), which "extended the reporting requirement to the (possible)
suspicion of money laundering resulting from serious and organised tax
fraud where complex mechanisms or procedures at an international level
are used., 29 4 In November 2007, the Belgian bar associations initiated a
second challenge to the implementation of the Second Directive. This
time the European Court of Justice refused to issue a ruling on the bar
associations' challenge that the Program Statute "obliges lawyers to
work with the government, and thus breaches the right to privacy
295
provided in article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights."
After the European Court of Justice declined its request for a preliminary
ruling, the Belgian Constitutional Court ruled that the Program Statute
was to remain applicable to lawyers.296
There is currently no draft legislation for the implementation of the
Third Directive available to the public yet. The pre-draft procedure was
interrupted because the process of forming the new government broke
down.2 97 The European Commission has initiated infringement
proceedings against Belgium for its failure to transpose the Directive by
the stipulated deadline.2 98 In the meantime, however, the Third Directive
is in full force and directly applicable in Belgium.299
4. United Kingdom
The United Kingdom was another one of the many Member States
that required additional convincing via the European Commission's
opening of infringement proceedings before it transposed the Second

292.
293.
294.

Implementation of the Third Directive: Belgium, supranote 291.
See supratext accompanying notes 239-54.
Implementation of the Third Directive: Belgium, supranote 291.

295.
296.
297.
298.
299.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra text accompanying note 266.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2008

41

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 1 [2008], Art. 8
HOFSTRA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 37:261

Directive.3 °° Part 7 of the 2002 Proceeds of Crime Act ("POCA")
implemented certain provisions of the Second Directive. 30 1 The Act was
brought into force on February 24, 2003, and "principally strengthened
obligations to report money laundering to the authorities, and the ability
of the authorities to give instructions to the reporting party not to
execute the operation., 302 In addition to the POCA, the government
issued the 2003 Money Laundering Regulations ("MLRs"), which
imposed statutory anti-money-laundering procedures on various
The Regulations also applied to lawyers who conducted
organizations. 303 TeRgl
legal work for their clients that could be categorized within one of the
activities listed in the Second Directive.3 °4
While Part 7 of the POCA, section 333(1), sets forth that tippingoff is a criminal offense,30 5 sections 333(2)(c) and 333(3) provide that a
person does not commit the offense if she is a "professional legal
adviser" and the disclosure is "to (or to a representative of) a client of
the professional legal adviser in connection with the giving by the
adviser of legal advice to the client, or to any person in connection with
legal proceedings or contemplated legal proceedings. 30 6 However, once
a Suspicious Activities Report (the United Kingdom's version of the
Suspicious Transaction Report) is made, lawyers are no longer allowed
to speak to their clients or any other parties regarding the Suspicious
Activity Report to authorities. 30 7 Furthermore, the POCA exceeds the
Article 8(1) requirement of the Second Directive in that the offense of
tipping-off can be committed if a disclosure of any type is made, not just
disclosure that information has been transmitted to the authorities.30 8
In 2005, the Criminal Division of the Court of Appeal in England
issued a small victory for opponents of anti-money-laundering
legislation in its ruling in Bowman v. Fels. 30 9 The central dispute in
Bowman arose out of a civil proceeding between Jennifer Mary Bowman
and William John Fels who had lived together for 10 years in a house
registered in Fels's sole name. When their relationship ended, Bowman

300.

See supra text accompanying note 266.

CCBE OVERVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 271, at question 1, § 22.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Proceeds of Crime Act, 2002, c. 29, § 333 (U.K.).
306. Id. § 333(2)(c), (3).
307. Delegates Challenge EU Money-Laundering Laws, IBA DAILY NEWS, Sept. 28, 2005, at
I [hereinafter DelegatesChallenge EU].
308. See Proceeds of Crime Act, 2002, c. 29, § 333(1).
309. Delegates Challenge EU,supra note 307, at 2.
301.
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asserted a beneficial interest in the property and proceedings ensued.31 °
Shortly before trial, Bowman's solicitors notified the National Criminal
Intelligence Service ("NCIS") of a suspicion that Fels had included
within business accounts the cost of works
carried out on the house
3
which were not properly business expenses. 1
Bowman's solicitors believed that section 328 of the POCA
required them to inform NCIS of this, but also prohibited them from
notifying either their client or the defendant Fels's solicitors of this
disclosure.3 12 Claimant's solicitors then made a "without notice"
application to the court for an order adjourning the trial date. 3 13 The
judge granted the order, which was served on Fels's solicitors without
the basis for the application being disclosed.314 Fels's solicitors
responded by requesting that the adjournment order be set aside and
disclosure be made of the basis and underlying evidence supporting the
claimant's application. 31 5 The lower court held that Bowman's solicitors
could have disclosed to both the court and Fels's solicitors why it sought
an adjournment and need not have stopped trial preparation. 31 6 Bowman
subsequently sought leave to appeal the lower court's judgment.
The central issue before the Court of Appeal was whether section
328 of the POCA means
that as soon as a lawyer acting for a client in legal proceedings
discovers or suspects anything in the proceedings that may facilitate
the acquisition, retention, use or control (usually by his own client or
his client's opponent) of "criminal property", he must immediately
notify NCIS of his belief if he is to avoid being guilty of the criminal
offence of being concerned in 317
an arrangement which he knows or
suspects facilitates such activity.
Section 328 of the POCA provides that "[a] person commits an
offence if he enters into or becomes concerned in an arrangement which
he knows or suspects facilitates (by whatever means) the acquisition,
retention, use or control of criminal property by or on behalf of another
person., 318 The court ultimately held that section 328 was not intended

310.

Bowman v. Fels, (2005) 1 W.L.R. 3083, 3087 (Eng.).

311. Id.at 3087-88.
312. Id.at 3088.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 3091.

318. Proceeds of Crime Act, 2002, c. 29, § 328(1).
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to cover or affect the ordinary conduct of litigation by legal
professionals, since that ordinary conduct did not fall within the concept
of "becoming concerned in an arrangement which... facilitates
... the
319
acquisition, retention, use or control of criminal property."
The United Kingdom has already implemented the Third Directive.
Following the publication of its consultation paper "Implementing the
Third Money Laundering Directive" in July 2006, the British Treasury
published the draft Money Laundering Regulations for 2007 for
consultation. 320 These 2007 Money Laundering Regulations entered into
force on December 15, 2007, thereby effectively implementing the Third
Directive in the UK.3 21 "Additionally, the Government has published an
anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing strategy document
that sets out how the challenges will be met over the next five years. 3 22
5. France
The legal profession in France has challenged the implementation
of the Second Directive since its adoption by the Council. Despite this
strong challenge, however, the Second Directive was partially
implemented into French law by the Law of 11 of February 2004 and the
Decree of 26 June 2006.323
The French bars petitioned the European Parliament in May 2003,
objecting to the Second Directive. 324 The petitioners' main argument
was that, by requiring lawyers to denounce their clients on the basis of
mere suspicion, the Second Directive breached the foundations of
justice, the Rule of Law and democracy, as well as the fundamental rules
of the legal profession. 325 Furthermore, petitioners maintained that
319. Bowman, I W.L.R.at3110.
320. HM
Treasury,
Money
Laundering
Regulations 2007,
http://www.hmtreasury.gov.uk/consult moneylaundering_2007.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2009).
321. IBA Anti-Money Laundering Forum, European Chart: IBA Overview of the
Implementation
of the
Third EU
Money-Laundering
Directive,
http://www.antimoneylaundering.orgfEuropeanChart.aspx [hereinafter IBA Overview of Implementation].
322. Id.
323. IBA Anti-Money Laundering Forum, The Lawyer's Guide to Legislation and
Compliance: France, http://www.anti-moneylaundering.org/europe/france.aspx (last visited Jan. 11,
2009) [hereinafter Implementation of the Third Directive: France].
324. COUNCIL OF BARS AND LAW SOC'YS OF EUR., POSITION OF THE COUNCIL OF THE BARS
AND LAW SOCIETIES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (CCBE) ON THE REQUIREMENTS ON A LAWYER TO
REPORT SUSPICIONS OF MONEY LAUNDERING AND ON THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION PROPOSAL FOR
A THIRD DIRECTIVE ON MONEY LAUNDERING REGULATIONS
10 (Nov. 2004).
325. Conseil National des Barreaux, Conseils de Vigilance et de Procedures Internes Destines A
Prdvenir I'Utilisation de la Profession d'Avocat aux Fins de Blanchiment des Capitaux d'Origine
Illicite et
de
Financement
du
Terrorisme,
at
II
(Sept.
2007), available at
http://www.cnb2008.com/docs/cahier-blanchiment.pdf.
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denunciation of crimes and offenses is alien to the professional practice
of a lawyer and since a lawyer is an auxiliary of justice, rather than of
the police, he is independent of the judge, of the client, of special interest
groups, as well as political authorities. 326
However, despite this apparent opposition to the Directives, the law
implementing the Third Directive is currently being discussed between
the government and the Conseil National des Barreaux. 327 On June 10,
2008, the French Parliament passed a bill, the Law on the Modernization
of the Economy, which would implement the Third Directive.328 The law
was slated to go before the French Senate on June 30, 2008, but has not
yet been passed. 329 However, "in the meantime, the Third EU Money
Laundering Directive has had direct effect since 15 December 2007."33°
VI.

WILL THE UNITED STATES BE THE NEW FRONTIER FOR THE
GATEKEEPER INITIATIVE?

The fact that many in the international community have chosen to
implement the FATF's recommendation calling for an expansion of the
Gatekeeper Initiative to include the legal profession has put pressure on
the United States to adopt similar measures. 33' This pressure became
even more apparent following the September 11 th attacks, when the
investigation of the attacks revealed that the
"terrorists were, in part,
' 332
funded through money laundering activities."
Almost overnight, the United States was made acutely aware of the
weaknesses in its financial systems and of the insufficiency of its current
money laundering countermeasures.33 3 In response to these attacks
Congress passed the "Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism," also
334
Act.
PATRIOT
USA
the
as
known

326.
327.
328.

Id.
Implementation of the Third Directive: France, supra note 323, at 1.
IBA Overview of Implementation, supra note 321.

329. Id.
330. Implementation of the Third Directive: France, supra note 323, at 1.
331. Rebecca Gregory, The Lawyer's Role: Will Uncle Sam Want You in the Fight Against
Money Laundering and Terrorism?,72 UMKC L. REV. 23,36 (2003).

332. Id. at 23-24.
333. Id. at 46.
334. Id.
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The USA PATRIOTAct

"For many years the Bank Secrecy Act has required banks and
other entities to file confidential reports of suspicious activities, known
as Suspicious Activity Reports ("SARs"), with the Treasury
Department's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN). '3 35
However, the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 made significant changes to
the money laundering and currency reporting laws, including major
amendments to the Bank Secrecy Act. 33 6 Most of the requirements
promulgated by the Act, including more stringent identification
requirements and the obligation to adopt anti-money laundering
programs, are directed toward institutions of the financial service
industry, including banks, trust companies, brokers, mutual funds, and
investment advisors.337
In particular, Title III of the Act, entitled the International Money
Laundering Abatement and Anti-Terrorism Financing Act of 2001, not
only alters, but also expands the responsibilities and possible liabilities
of the United States in regards to countering money laundering and the
financing of terrorist activities. 338 This portion of the Act requires all
parties subject to it to establish due diligence policies, procedures, and
controls necessary to detect money laundering in all private accounts
opened and maintained in the United States for foreign individuals.3 39
Such policies include[:] (1) employee training and education to ensure
employees are sensitive to customers and transactions that have a risk
of money laundering, (2) the adoption of 'best practices' prescribed
from time to time by domestic regulatory bodies and trade
organizations, and (3) extensive customer identification
programs that
340
require financial institutions to know their customers.
Financial institutions, subject to these policies, and their officers,
directors, and employees, must report suspicions of money laundering in

335. Nicole M. Healy, Ad Hoc Task Force on ProfessionalResponsibilitiesRegarding Money
Laundering:PATRIOTAct and Gatekeeper Update, 37 INT'L LAW. 631,635 (2003).

336. Gregory, supra note 331, at 46.
337. Id. at 48; see also Henry Christensen III, Application to Lawyers of Current Anti-Money
Laundering Rules Adopted by the FinancialAction Task Force on Money Laundering (FA TF) and

the United States Government: Recommendations of Good Practicesfor ACTEC Fellows, 31
ACTEC J. 302,309 (2006).
338. Christensen, supra note 337, at 309.
339. Id.at 310.
340. Henry Christensen III
& M. Catherine Pieroni, Anti-Money Laundering Legislation andits
Impact on Gatekeepers, in INTERNATIONAL TAX & ESTATE PLANNING 2007: STRATEGIES &
TECHNIQUES FOR MAXIMUM ADVANTAGE 33, 41 (2007).
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a customer account by filing a SAR with the appropriate government
agencies. 34 1 The Act also prohibits any covered institution from alerting
the customer when a SAR has been filed.342
FinCEN is one of the delegated regulatory and enforcement
agencies charged with overseeing portions of the USA PATRIOT Act.
In particular, it oversees the Act's financial crimes provisions 343 and
"monitors [the] covered institutions to ensure they are complying with
344
all of the anti-money laundering requirements imposed by U.S. law."
"If FinCEN finds evidence of wrongdoing, either actual participation in
money laundering schemes or loopholes or failures in the anti-money
345
laundering rules or procedures, it may apply severe penalties."
B. The Lawyer's Role Under the USA PATRIOT Act
Shortly after the terrorist attacks of September 1 th, the FATF met
in Washington, D.C. to discuss expanding its mandate beyond
"traditional money laundering" to include terrorist financing. 346 The
result of that meeting was the Consultation Paper prepared and
published for comment in 2002.347 In response to this Consultation
Paper, the former President of the American Bar Association formed the
Task Force on the Gatekeeper Regulation and the Profession. 348 The
main objective of the Task Force was to review the FATF's proposals
and to determine whether the Gatekeeper Initiative should extend to
lawyers in the United States. 349 The Task Force "responded with its own
set of recommendations, endorsing certain aspects of FATF's proposals
and rejecting others. 350
Even though the Task Force approved the general principle that
efforts must be made to fight terrorism and money laundering, and that
lawyers should take part in that effort, it also fervently maintained that

341.

Id.

342. Id.
343. Christensen, supra note 337 at 310.
344.

Christensen & Pieroni, supra note 340, at 41.

345. Id.
346. Gregory, supranote 331, at 36.
347. Id.; see also ABA Task Force on Gatekeeper Regulation & the Profession, Comments of
the ABA Task Force on Gatekeeper Regulation and the Profession on the Financial Action Task

Force Consultation Paper dated May 30, 2002, at 2-3

(Aug. 23, 2002), available at

http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/taskforce/comments.doc [hereinafter Comments of the ABA Task

Force].
348.

Comments of the ABA Task Force, supra note 347, at 3.

349. Id.
350. Gregory, supra note 331, at 38.
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the FATF's Recommendations must be limited "primarily" to lawyers
"who, when acting as financial intermediaries, receive and transfer funds
on behalf of clients." 35 1 While the Task Force recognized that in many
instances lawyers serve as gatekeepers to the world's financial systems,
based on
it strongly opposed the requirement that lawyers submit SARs 352
"mere suspicion" that the funds derived from an illegal activity.
It justified this position by reasoning that the duties of loyalty and
confidentiality form the "bedrock" of the attorney-client relationship in
the United States.3 53 Therefore, imposing such a reporting requirement
would fundamentally undermine every aspect of that hallowed
relationship.3 54 In the words of the ABA Task Force, the attorney would
turn into a "potential government informant., 355 Furthermore, the Task
Force determined that the FATF's recommended exceptions to such
reporting duties for privileged communications and when the lawyer is
involved in litigation for his client were inadequate since the distinction
between privileged and non-privileged information is unlikely to be
clean or workable.356
However, in 2003, "the legal profession encountered the first
potential gatekeeper requirements in FinCEN's preparations to regulate
persons involved in real estate closings and settlements. 35 7 In an
"advance notice of proposed rulemaking," FinCEN indicated that
358
lawyers involved in real estate transactions could be subject to the rule
via section 352(a) of the USA PATRIOT Act, which requires all
financial institutions, including "persons involved in real estate closings
and settlements, to maintain money laundering compliance programs. 359
FinCEN justified its new rule by arguing that, "attorneys often play a
key role in real estate closings and settlements. 3 60 However, FinCEN
also noted, with regard to attorneys, that section 352(a) "does not
prescribe any reporting requirements, and thus does not raise issues of
attorney-client privilege. 3 6'

351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.

Comments of the ABA Task Force, supra note 347, at 4.
Id. at 15-16.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 16.
Id.
Id. at 17.
Edward J. Krauland & Aaron R. Hutman, Money Laundering Enforcement and Policy, 38

INT'L LAW. 509, 518 (2003).

358.
359.
360.
361.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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At periodic intervals the FATF "sends small working groups of
representatives of member states to other member states ... to conduct
'Mutual evaluations"' regarding the state's success in adopting its
Recommendations.3 62 The third and last Mutual Evaluation Report on
efforts in the United States to combat money laundering was issued in
2006.363 While the Report concluded that the United States, through the
USA PATRIOT Act, was in substantial compliance with most of the
Recommendations, it also concluded that it364was "lagging" in compliance
with some of the other Recommendations.
More specifically, the Report noted that the efforts of the United
States with respect to Recommendation 16, which sought to extend the
Gatekeeper Initiative to lawyers and notaries, were inadequate and noncompliant. 365 The FATF Report also recommended that accountants,
lawyers, and real estate agents be made subject to the "tipping-off'
provision of Recommendation 16, and should be protected from liability
366
when they choose to file a suspicious transactions report.
In response to the Report, FinCEN has "urg[ed] professional
organizations in the United States to adopt guides of best practices" in
order to fulfill the goals of FATF Recommendation 16.367 However,
FinCEN has so far "refrained from extending provisions of the U.S.A.
PATRIOT Act to cover lawyers acting as principals, even though it has
extended coverage of the Act to parties outside the banking and financial
industries. 368 The ABA also continues to warn against the adoption of
any such regulations 369 since its ramifications would include sacrificing
the "dearly held principle that attorneys and clients enjoy and depend on
a relationship founded on loyalty and confidentiality. 37 0
The United States has adopted most of the FATF recommendations
through implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act. However, the
United States still lags behind other countries, including Canada,
Switzerland, and the EU Member States, in the adoption of measures
that would call upon lawyers to take a more active role in the fight

362. Christensen & Pieroni, supra note 340, at 46.
363. Id.
364. Id.at 47.
365. FAFT-GAIF, Third Mutual Evaluation Report on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating
the Financing of Terrorism: United States of America, at 210-11 (June 23, 2006), available at
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/44/9/37101772.pdf.
366. Id. at 210.
367. Christensen & Pieroni, supra note 340, at 48.
368. Id.at So.
369. ABA Comments on the Gatekeeper Initiative, supra note 31, at 12.
370. Gregory, supra note 33 1, at 50.
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against money laundering and terrorist financing. The opinions in the
United States regarding the Gatekeeper Initiative and its application to
lawyers diverge greatly. However, the opinion that has prevailed, so far,
is that the principle of attorney-client confidentiality must be
preserved.37
VII.

CONCLUSION

It is undisputed that the objective of the EU money-laundering
directives to combat and prevent criminal activity by cracking down on
the money laundering operations that are derived from and finance these
crimes is well-founded. However, the broad scope and application of
these directives may prove to have dire consequences. The directives
undermine the principle of lawyer-client confidentiality by forcing
lawyers to investigate the identity of all their clients, the sources of their
funds, and their motives for seeking legal advice, as well as requiring
that lawyers disclose confidential information about their clients when
they know, suspect, or even just have reasonable grounds to suspect that
money laundering or terrorist financing is being or has been committed
or attempted.
the
public
Since
lawyer-client
confidentiality
"serves
administration of justice by ensuring client candor and promoting trust
and loyalty in the relationship between clients and their lawyers, which
is necessary for effective representation, ' '372 the directives risk damaging
more than just the privacy of clients. Due to the vague definition of
when a lawyer is providing the type of legal services subject to the
directives, "the uncertainty of what should trigger suspicions, and the
breadth of the underlying predicate offenses," many European lawyers
may find themselves forced to view each client with suspicion.37 3 This
will ultimately reduce the client's willingness to confide in the lawyer
completely, which will in turn adversely affect the efficacy with which
the lawyer is able to represent the client.
Further difficulties arise through the fact that the directives set forth
three different requisite knowledge standards. If the lawyer determines
that his legal services for a particular client are subject to the reporting
duties of the directives then he must disclose confidential information of
his client if he merely suspects that the client is or is attempting to
launder money or finance terrorism. If the lawyer determines that his
371.

See, e.g., ABA Comments on the Gatekeeper initiative, supra note 31, at 12.

372. Shaughnessy, supra note 1,at 44.
373. Id.
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dealings with the client fall within one of the enumerated exemptions,
then the lawyer may keep the client's information confidential unless he
has actual knowledge that the client is using his services to launder
money or finance terrorism. In that case, he must report the client's
activities to the appropriate authorities.
However, if under this exemption, the lawyer only has knowledge
of his client's illegal activities, which he inferred from the objective
circumstances surrounding his dealings with that client, as opposed to
actual knowledge, then the lawyer is not required to file an STR. He may
still, however, be charged with aiding money laundering. Thus, lawyers
will now be more wary of taking on clients merely to escape the
possibility of criminal charges themselves. The practical effect of this is
that while the lawyer has denied his services to many clients who in fact
were seeking his services in order to launder money, he will also have
invariably denied his services to some innocent clients as well.
Thus, while the objectives of the directives are well-founded, the
pursuit of those objectives may have come at quite an expense. The EU
has led the way in extending the scope of the Gatekeeper Initiative to
lawyers and it remains to be seen whether other countries will adopt a
similar approach to fighting money laundering. In particular, lawyers in
the United States must consider whether the government may one day
consider the fundamental principle of lawyer-client confidentiality a
necessary casualty in its war against terror.
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